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ARTICLES
ACQUIRING LAND USE RIGHTS IN
TODAY’S CHINA: A SNAPSHOT FROM
ON THE GROUND

Gregory M. Stein*
ABSTRACT
For the interested observer of contemporary real estate
markets, China is the most fascinating place in the world, and
the coming years promise to be no less exciting. This Article
offers an overview of how a specific segment of the Chinese
real estate market—the acquisition of land use rights—operates in practice, from both a legal and business perspective.
I recently interviewed dozens of Chinese and Western experts who are taking part in one of the greatest real estate
booms in world history. My conversations with these real estate developers, bankers, government officials, judges, practicing lawyers, consultants, economists, real estate agents, and
law and business professors provide acute insights into how
China is transforming itself from an economic backwater into
a self-styled “socialist market economy.”
The fact that Chinese real estate and business laws are
still in an early stage of development, the speed with which the
Chinese legal and economic systems are evolving, and the
strong cultural tradition of reliance on personal relationships
rather than rule-of-law principles all demonstrate why a
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real estate industry has become.
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straightforward doctrinal approach would be incomplete and
misleading. My goal here is to establish how this particular
aspect of Chinese real estate practice is maturing with what
appears to be tremendous success against the backdrop of a
young legal system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The West has become fascinated with China. Journalists
marvel at China’s ability to maintain double-digit growth year
after year while expressing concern about America’s rising trade
imbalance with this important partner.1 American consumers
enjoy lower and lower prices for Chinese-made goods ranging
from textiles to DVD players, while American manufacturers decry the ability of Chinese factories to underprice their few surviving American competitors. Trading partners welcome China into
the World Trade Organization while wondering what effect that
nation’s economic expansion will have on the price and availability of critical commodities, particularly oil.2
Not lost in this discussion is the astonishing real estate boom
throughout China, especially in its major eastern metropolitan
areas.3 Shanghai, China’s key financial center located near the
mouth of the Yangtze River, is said to be the home to one-fifth of
the world’s construction cranes, which local residents refer to as
China’s national bird.4 Developers are ordering structural steel
at a rate that is causing shortages and price increases around the
globe. Shanghai residents speak of little else but their desire to
purchase residential apartments as soon as possible, so as not to
1. See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria et al., Does the Future Belong to China?, NEWSMay 9, 2005, at 26 (lead article in issue entitled “Special Report: China’s
Century” that contains nine stories devoted to China); How to Make China Even
Richer, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2006, at 11 (lead article in issue entitled “Special
Issue on China’s Reform Tasks: How to make China even richer” that contains eight
stories devoted to China).
2. See generally RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD
RULE OF LAW 492–96 (2002) [hereinafter PEERENBOOM, LONG MARCH] (discussing
immediate effects and likely future implications of China’s accession to the World
Trade Organization, along with continuing reasons for concern); Keith Bradsher &
Christopher Pala, China Ups the Ante in its Bid for Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2005, at
C1 (“One of China’s state-owned oil companies may still be smarting from its failure
to acquire Unocal this summer. But another Chinese oil giant showed on Monday
that this country is still snapping up assets to satisfy its hunger for energy.”); Jad
Mouawad, Outlook on the Economy: With Oil Prices Off their Peak, Are Supplies
Assured?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2005, at C10 (“In 2004, global oil consumption rose
3.7 percent, . . . a pace that surprised analysts and oil executives. China alone accounted for a third of that growth, its demand for oil up 15 percent.”).
3. David Barboza, China Builds its Dreams, and Some Fear a Bubble, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2005, at A1 (“This year alone, Shanghai will complete towers with
more space for living and working than there is in all the office buildings in New
York City”).
4. Many observers are particularly struck by the prevalence of construction
cranes in Shanghai. See, e.g., PAMELA YATSKO, NEW SHANGHAI: THE ROCKY REBIRTH OF CHINA’S LEGENDARY CITY 26 (2001) [hereinafter YATSKO, NEW SHANGHAI] (“Shanghai . . . embarked in 1992 on what has to be one of the biggest building
sprees the world has ever seen. From the top of the Hilton Hotel, which in 1995 was
still one of the tallest buildings in the city, the horizon yielded more tower cranes in
every direction than the eye could count.”).

WEEK,
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miss out on a bonanza that may not recur in their lifetimes. This
is a truly remarkable development in a nation in which all land
still is owned by governmental units or agricultural collectives,
and the government is firmly controlled by a single political party
that remains Communist at least in name.5
This Article offers an overview of how a specific segment of
the Chinese real estate market—the acquisition of land use
rights—operates in practice, from both a legal and business perspective. During the summer of 2005, I interviewed dozens of
Chinese and Western experts who are currently taking part in
what can be described, without exaggeration, as one of the greatest real estate booms in world history.6 My conversations with
these real estate developers, bankers, government officials,
judges, practicing lawyers, real estate consultants, economists,
real estate agents, law professors, business professors, law students, and recent homebuyers provide acute insights into a major
nation that is quickly transforming itself from an economic backwater into a self-styled “socialist market economy.”7
Although I also rely on more traditional methods of legal
scholarship in this Article, the fact that Chinese real estate and
business laws are still in an early stage of development, the speed
with which the Chinese legal and economic systems are evolving,
5. “The emergence of real estate markets in China to their current stage of
development has been nothing short of astonishing particularly in the absence of any
concept of market structure.” Keith McKinnell & Anthony Walker, China’s Land
Reform and the Establishment of a Property Market: Problems and Prospects, in THE
IMPACT OF CHINA’S ECONOMIC REFORMS UPON LAND, PROPERTY AND CONSTRUCTION 46 (Jean Jinghan Chen & David Wills eds., 1999) [hereinafter LAND, PROPERTY AND CONSTRUCTION]. The changes in China since the late 1980s are similarly
remarkable. See Li Ling Hin, Pricing of Land in China’s Reforms, in LAND, PROPERTY AND CONSTRUCTION, supra, at 55 (noting that “[b]efore 1987 the portion of
the real estate industry in the GNP of the PRC was only around 3–4%, which was
substantially lower than most of the East European socialist countries.”).
6. See infra notes 84, 102 (discussing statistics reflecting growth in China’s real
estate sector).
7. The 1982 Chinese Constitution states that the “basic task of the nation . . . is
to concentrate its efforts on socialist modernisation.” XIAN FA [Constitution]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 4, 1982, revised
Apr. 12, 1988, Mar. 29, 1993, Mar. 19, 1999 & Mar. 14, 2004, effective Mar. 14, 2004),
preamble (2004) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter PRC Constitution]. The 1993 revisions added
that this task must be accomplished “in accordance with the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Id. (1993). This last phrase was dropped in
2004, in favor of the term “Chinese-style socialism.” Id. (2004). The clause “socialist market economy” first appeared in this paragraph in 1999. Id. (2004). Phrasing
of this type is not limited to legal documents emanating from Beijing. For example,
PUDONG YEARBOOK 2004, the most current edition of an annual publication touting
recent accomplishments in the development of the Pudong New Area in Shanghai,
states that “Pudong will take [the] lead in basic socialist modernization.” PUDONG
NIAN JIAN 2004 [PUDONG YEARBOOK 2004] 18 (2004) [hereinafter PUDONG YEARBOOK 2004].
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and the intensely strong cultural tradition of reliance on personal
relationships rather than rule-of-law principles all demonstrate
why a straightforward doctrinal approach would be incomplete
and misleading. My goal here is to establish how this particular
aspect of Chinese real estate practice is maturing with what appears to be tremendous success against the backdrop of a young
legal system.8 In future work, I plan to examine other features of
current Chinese real estate practice—particularly the mortgage
loan market—in the same manner.
Part II of this Article provides an overview and discussion of
my research methodology, presents several preliminary observations, and briefly offers some relevant history. Part III describes
the typical ownership entity in a Chinese commercial real estate
transaction. Part IV discusses site selection. The focus of Part V
is on the clearing of the land, with emphasis on the processes
commonly employed to remove both existing structures and their
current occupants. Part VI defines and describes the Chinese
land use right itself, and Part VII presents my conclusions and
raises several important and related real estate issues that I will
address in later articles.
II. OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY, PRELIMINARY
OBSERVATIONS, AND BACKGROUND HISTORY
A. OVERVIEW

AND

METHODOLOGY

I first had the opportunity to visit China during the spring of
2003, when I served as a Fulbright Scholar at Shanghai Jiaotong
University Law School. I had never before seen real estate development on the scale I observed during this initial stay and
knew immediately that I wanted to understand how this nation—
with a legal system, history, and cultural background so dramatically different from those of the United States—was managing to
accomplish a complete rebuilding of its structures and infrastructure so rapidly.
Although I have been teaching and engaging in scholarship
in the areas of real estate finance and land use since 1990, all of
my experience prior to my arrival in China was within the context of the American system. So, I initially believed that my very
limited Chinese-language communication skills would hinder my
ability to undertake this research. I quickly learned that this belief was incorrect. China does not yet have a comprehensive
8. “The economic bird has already escaped from its cage, the economic plan,
but the legal bird remains in its own cage, although it is stirring and the dimensions
of the cage may be changing.” STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 2 (1999) [hereinafter LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE].
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property law on the books.9 Furthermore, China’s legal system is
developing so rapidly that the few property law sources that exist
are almost immediately obsolete.10 Thus even an experienced
reader of Chinese would be hampered by a lack of traditional
legal materials.
In addition, the legal academy in China still is recovering
from the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. This means that
there is a shortage of experts in property law and real estate finance just as the nation begins to grapple with the question of
how to harmonize private ownership with Communist principles.
Those Chinese citizens who have developed expertise in the
emerging legal and business systems of China are more likely to
be profiting from it than writing treatises about it. In fact, when I
returned to China and began meeting with real estate experts,
more than one of my counterparts expressed gratitude that I had
undertaken this project and indicated how great a need there is
for more written material in this field. Many were extremely curious to hear what I had learned from others with whom I had
already spoken and insistent that I send them copies of my finished work.11
This scarcity of written information led me to conclude that
the best way to comprehend the current real estate climate in
China and the massive changes of the last decade is to speak to
the professionals who are operating within the country. These
are the only people who have the expertise and insight that might
be found in the United States in the accumulated knowledge of
an established law school faculty or in the treatises and primary
sources acquired over the decades by a bar association library.
So I returned to Shanghai during the summer of 2005 with the
goal of interviewing as many people as I could who were knowledgeable about Chinese real estate law and business as actually
practiced.
Between May and July of 2005, I interviewed more than fifty
experts in the real estate field. Legal experts included practicing
lawyers, law professors, judges, government officials with legal
training, and law students. Non-lawyer business experts included
9. See infra note 17 & accompanying text, note 96 & accompanying text.
10. Interestingly, the most thorough and complete resource I have found is written in English and published for a Western audience. PATRICK A. RANDOLPH JR. &
LOU JIANBO, CHINESE REAL ESTATE LAW (2000) [hereinafter RANDOLPH & LOU,
CREL].
11. One real estate developer expressed his frustration that not only are there
no sources in this field, there also is no one else conducting research with a goal
toward creating any such sources. Our translator, who was reasonably knowledgeable about this area of law, then editorialized that government policies have been
changing so fast that anything that could have been published would already be
outdated anyway.
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real estate developers, bankers, consultants focusing on the real
estate sector, economists, business professors, real estate agents,
and non-lawyer government officials. Most of these experts are
Chinese—some of whom have studied or lived in the West—with
the rest being Westerners currently residing in China. Most of
the specialists I met were able to converse in English, but in several cases I made use of a translator, including some meetings
with persons who speak reasonably good English but felt more
comfortable with a translator present. Many of the people with
whom I spoke are recent homebuyers themselves.
To the greatest extent possible, I sought out a wide range of
viewpoints.12 At the same time, my selection was not random: I
intentionally attempted to reach experts in various different subfields, I sought out the most knowledgeable experts I could identify in each of these sub-fields, and some of my interview requests were turned down. Furthermore, my sample was skewed
by the obvious reality that all of my interview subjects were people comfortable meeting with an interested foreigner. Thus, “cooperative people were undoubtedly somewhat overrepresented
in the sample.”13 I generally asked questions from a long list I
had prepared before my first interview, but this list evolved
throughout the weeks of my field research. In addition, I tai12. As Robert Ellickson, author of one of the classic legal field studies, states,
“Instead of interviewing many persons who saw the problem from the same perspective, I sought out lesser numbers representing many different perspectives.” Robert
C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 655 (1986) [hereinafter Ellickson, Coase and Cattle].
See also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991) (presenting expanded treatment of his research into informal norms observed by California cattle
ranchers).
The problem of finding reliable sources is particularly acute in China. As Professor Donald Clarke notes:
By piecing together information from [a variety of] sources, Chinese
and foreign scholars have been able to assemble a picture of certain
aspects of the Chinese legal system. That picture is by no means complete. But fleshing it out requires a great deal of thought about what
information needs to be gathered and how it can be gathered
effectively.
Donald C. Clarke, Empirical Research into the Chinese Judicial System, in BEYOND
COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 164, 167
(Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003). See also id. at 180 (internal citations omitted) (noting that “[f]ieldwork can yield interesting and original results, but
unfortunately it typically does not yield representative statistics unless great care is
taken in selecting the objects of study”).
13. Ellickson, Coase and Cattle, supra note 12, at 655. For an extremely thorough discussion of the biases inherent in this type of information-gathering about
the Chinese legal system, see Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The
Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11–14 (2005). Professor
Liebman emphasizes, for example, how important personal introductions are when
conducting field research in China and notes the ways in which this unavoidable bias
can affect research results. Id. at 13.
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lored the questions to the expertise of the particular interviewee,
both in my pre-interview preparation and “on the fly,” as each
interview progressed. All interviews were face-to-face, with preinterview logistics and follow-up discussions typically conducted
by telephone, e-mail, or text message. I opted not to record my
interviews, in part out of a belief that this approach might encourage more frankness from my counterparts.
While I do not rely on doctrinal legal sources to the degree
that is typical in law review articles, this Article is also not a journalistic or anthropological account. To the extent I have been
able to identify more traditional doctrinal works, I have consulted them and have used these sources as a method of corroborating or challenging the information I gleaned from my
interviewees. I cite these works throughout this Article. Where I
have unearthed discrepancies between interviews and published
sources, I have so noted. These discrepancies might indicate
faulty memories, intentional misinformation, or inaccuracies on
the part of either the speaker or the published source (or me).
They also could reflect the reality that the actual application of
published laws in China, as described to me by my counterparts,
can vary significantly from the text of those laws.
The Article that follows therefore differs from many of the
more traditional works that appear in American law journals. It
is not intended to be an authoritative doctrinal treatise on its
subject; by necessity, it is impressionistic. It focuses on Shanghai,
with secondary emphasis on Beijing, and thus primarily reflects
the current state of real estate law and business in those two major cities. A small percentage of the people I met with were not
particularly forthcoming, although I nearly always was surprised
at how willing these experts were both to meet with a total (and
foreign) stranger and to discuss often proprietary aspects of their
work. Their forthrightness frequently included direct criticism of
government policies, a brave act in a nation where such conduct
can subject the speaker to government harassment or worse.
My occasional need to use a translator when interviewing
my counterparts14 introduced barriers, though not always the
14. The number of Chinese professionals who speak some level of English is
growing. Several people suggested to me that China soon will have more English
speakers than the United States, although the average level of fluency for these
speakers is much lower. However, because the real estate markets are inherently so
domestic, real estate lawyers have fewer occasions to cross paths with foreign business people and lawyers and thus less need for English-language fluency. My experience suggests that Chinese real estate lawyers and professionals had lower levels of
English proficiency than many other Chinese lawyers and professionals. Conversely, many educated Chinese who are fluent in English have little familiarity with
Western real estate concepts and terminology. This occasionally led to translation
barriers of a different sort. See infra note 15.
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precise ones I had anticipated.15 Several of the people with
whom I spoke requested that I not attribute their comments to
them, and one even asked me not to take notes during our conversation. Out of respect for the generosity of my conversation
partners, and in recognition of the fact that some of them have
strong reasons for not wanting attribution, I have decided to refer to all of my contacts anonymously.16
My goal here is to convey an up-to-date description of how
the players in the world’s most explosive real estate market function. They are operating in a wide-open legal environment, with
the National People’s Congress still debating the nation’s first
comprehensive property code.17 They cannot fall back on conventional wisdom in a field in which no one has more than a few
years of experience and there are few who can serve as mentors.
They also must conduct business under an authoritarian oneparty government that severely limits freedom of expression
while attempting to merge free markets and strict government
control into a system of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”18 The legal structure is far from transparent, enforcement
15. Originally, I assumed that speaking through a translator would lead to two
primary barriers. First, it would create a “leak” of information that is transmitted
twice, as any childhood player of “Telephone” would expect. Second, there would
be accompanying delays that tend to stilt conversation. In fact, the main barrier was
that my translators were less familiar with real estate finance concepts than either of
the two people for whom they were translating. My real estate counterpart and I
frequently had to have side discussions with our common translator to ensure that
they were properly comprehending and translating the real estate concepts and
terms that the two of us were more familiar with using, albeit in different languages.
16. I have opted not to refer to any of my interview subjects by name, and I
have occasionally and intentionally been opaque in describing their affiliation or
specialty. Although most people I met with expressed no reservations about my
identifying them, I do not wish to expose any individual who was kind enough to
spend time meeting with me and sharing their expertise to any sort of negative
repercussions.
17. It is widely expected that the National People’s Congress will adopt this
code in March 2007. Recent National People’s Congress debates over the proposed
in rem property law have exposed serious ideological splits within the Chinese Communist Party, with some arguing for continued rapid development and others responding that this trend is contrary to socialist principles. See Joseph Kahn, A Sharp
Debate Erupts in China over Ideologies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, at A1 (noting
“calls to make ‘social equity’ the focus of economic policy, replacing the earlier leadership’s emphasis on rapid growth and wealth creation”). See also LUBMAN, BIRD IN
A CAGE, supra note 8, at 2 (“[G]iven the novelty of the legal institutions created or
revived since the late 1970s, it is no wonder that their development has been limited,
hesitant, and uncertain.”); infra note 96 & accompanying text (discussing the fact
that treatment of relocatees is holding up reforms of property law).
18. See, e.g., Keith McKinnell & Anthony Walker, China’s Land Reform and the
Establishment of a Property Market: Problems and Prospects, in LAND, PROPERTY
AND CONSTRUCTION, supra note 5, at 46–47 (comparing recent changes in behavior
with stasis in institutional structure, and quoting Deng Xiaoping’s comment, “‘The
existing political system has now proved to be a formidable constraint to furthering
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of the laws that are on the books is inconsistent and commonly
graft-ridden, and the rule of law is viewed as a Western concept
that does not interlock well with Chinese traditions.19
In short, this is a field survey of how the participants in a
major and booming industry operate against a background of legal and policy uncertainty. I believe my description to be accurate, I expect it is incomplete, I assume it soon will become
obsolete, and I remind the reader that I am attempting to depict
Chinese real estate law and business as actually practiced, not as
officially written.
B. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
Before plunging into my discussion, I set forth here several
preliminary observations about China’s real estate markets, as a
means of highlighting the themes of the discussion that follows.
These points merit emphasis at the outset, because they differ
significantly from what an American lawyer or business person
might predict based on their domestic experience. Thus, these
observations serve to remind the reader that the assumptions an
American expert brings to the more detailed discussion that follows will not necessarily apply in China.
First, it is important to remember that all legal structures
and institutions in this area of Chinese law are new and still
evolving. Thus, nothing is time-tested.20 As a result, lawyers and
the course of economic reform.’”); supra note 7 (discussing evolving language of
Chinese Constitution regarding the role of socialism).
19. See, e.g., LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE, supra note 8, at 11 (“The rule of law
was alien and unknown [in China] throughout thousands of years of authoritarian
rule.”). Western observers today generally seem to believe that China is well on the
road to accepting at least a thin core of rule-of-law principles. See, e.g., PEERENBOOM, LONG MARCH, supra note 2, at 20 (“the notion that the PRC economy will
be able to sustain economic growth without further legal reforms that bring the system into greater compliance with the basic requirements of a thin conception of rule
of law is doubtful”). Professor Peerenboom also notes, however, that some scholars,
particularly those in the Critical Legal Studies school, believe that Western imposition of rule-of-law concepts on China is a thinly veiled attempt to oppress and inflict
injustice. Id. at 164.
20. “Legal reform has been driven by economic reform, and virtually every element of Chinese law today was either revived or newly created in the course of two
decades of extraordinary economic and social change that have begun to transform
Chinese society.” LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE, supra note 8, at 102. See also PEERENBOOM, LONG MARCH, supra note 2, at 268 (“Inevitably, rules change more often
during periods of transition, leading to instability and inconsistency”). One pair of
commentators described the Chinese market as of 1999 as an “embryo.” Keith McKinnell & Anthony Walker, China’s Land Reform and the Establishment of a Property Market: Problems and Prospects, in LAND, PROPERTY AND CONSTRUCTION,
supra note 5, at 48.
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real estate developers frequently operate by trial and error.21
Second, and following from the first point, there are no seasoned
experts in the field. The most senior real estate professionals in
China have plied their trade for little more than a decade and
have experienced only boom times. This Gold Rush mentality
and lack of experience is visible throughout the real estate market.22 Third, there is a much greater reliance on personal relationships (guanxi) than in Western nations.23 International
demands that China adhere to rule-of-law principles garner much
attention in China but often are given little more than lip service.24 “[T]here is a significant gap between the law-in-the-books
and the law-in-action, between enacted rules and actual practice,
and between the officially professed ideals and objectives of the
legal system on the one hand, and on the other hand its practical
management, operation and impact on those who come into contact with it.”25
Fourth, the Chinese legal system is surprisingly undeveloped
given how advanced the Chinese property markets have become.26 A casual observer viewing Shanghai’s skyline for the
21. “In China today . . . rules are being adopted even while new transactions are
themselves emerging and before much experience has been accumulated about
them.” LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE, supra note 8, at 175.
22. This same comment could be made about various other areas of Chinese
life. For example, most automobile drivers have been operating a motor vehicle for
no more than a few years, and the staid looking forty-five year old driver of that
Shanghai GM sedan that is bearing down on you probably has no more experience
or good judgment behind the wheel than the typical American teenager.
23. “[T]he Chinese emphasis on relationships (guanxi) seems to have had a
strength and durability for thousands of years that make it more powerful and pervasive than comparable Western emphases.” LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE, supra note
8, at 304. Professor Lubman also notes, “In China, rights and duties are contextual,
depending on the relationship of individuals to each other, and each conflict must be
addressed in terms of the alternative consequences with a view to finding a basis for
cooperation and harmony.” Id. at 19 (internal citations omitted).
24. In a foreword to an earlier edition of Professor Albert H.Y. Chen’s extremely useful treatise on Chinese law, Professor Jerome Cohen writes, “Mr. Chen
keeps a sharp eye on the gap between law and life, between theory and practice.
This is an indispensable element in accurately portraying any system, but particularly one where the gap is often very great and so too is the government’s effort to
conceal it.” ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA x (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter CHEN, INTRODUCTION]
(quoting from Foreword to the First Edition, published in 1992, by Jerome Alan
Cohen).
25. Id. at 202. Professor Chen continues by noting that closing this gap constitutes an important part “of the ongoing project of building a sound legal system for
China.” Id.
26. “Chinese economic success defies conventional theory, which requires, as
one economist has observed, that ‘To function anywhere near its potential, any economic system must have property rights that are much better defined and enforced
than is true of China’s mixed economic system today.’” LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE,
supra note 8, at 117 (internal citations omitted). “Neither the game nor its rules . . .
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first time would assume that Chinese property law has matured
significantly since Mao’s death, but this assumption is only partly
accurate.27 Those who work within China’s real estate market
often can only guess how problems that might arise in the future
will be resolved.28 And legal changes, though rapid, often have
been incremental, responding to only the most immediate
needs.29 Fifth, in spite of some movement by China toward a
freer and less regulated market, those who operate within the
Chinese legal and economic system still must endure a far greater
level of government involvement, intrusion, and interference
than American real estate professionals typically experience.
More generally, there is a lack of transparency within the legal
system, and citizens simply take it as a given that the results of an
individual’s actions may be difficult to predict. Finally, things
continue to change dramatically and rapidly, as Chinese citizens
develop more expertise, as the government reverses course and
then doubles back again, and as foreigners continue to exert increasing influence, both through their personal business activities
and their institutional law reform efforts.
C. BACKGROUND HISTORY
Show me a Chinese centenarian and I will show you a person who has lived through unbelievable change in her lifetime.
She will have been born in the waning days of the Qing Dynasty,
with the Last Emperor soon to succumb to the republican revoluseem to be free from ambiguity.” Id. at 174. More generally, “because of the absence of a unifying concept of law and a considerable fragmentation of authority,
China does not have a legal system.” Id. at 317 (emphasis in original). But see PEERENBOOM, LONG MARCH, supra note 2, at 565–68 (strongly contesting this last
argument).
27. “[T]he fact that the law sometimes lags behind the rapidly changing circumstances of economic reform . . . has a negative effect on legal efficacy.” CHEN, INTRODUCTION, supra note 24, at 116.
28. “[F]ormal legal institutions . . . have to struggle against the cultural and
social forces in Chinese society that tend to weaken and undermine property rights.”
LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE, supra note 8, at 118.
29. See, e.g., PEERENBOOM, LONG MARCH, supra note 2, at 558–59 (noting the
parallels between incremental economic reforms during the 1990s and incremental
legal reforms more recently); XIN CHUNYING, CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM & CURRENT
LEGAL REFORM 343 (1999) [hereinafter XIN, CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM] (noting that
Chinese legal reform has been “carried out step by step and in an orderly way”). In
a phrase often attributed to Deng Xiaoping, the process of reform is comparable to
“crossing the river by feeling the stones.” See, e.g., Caution against loopholes in
reform, CHINA VIEW, Mar. 24, 2006, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
2006-03/24/content_4339286.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007) (contrasting a more modern reform plan proposed in Shenzhen with an incremental approach and attributing
this phrase to Deng).
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tion of 1911.30 A quarter-century of upheaval followed, marked
by four years of a shaky republic, twelve years of regional control
by warlords, and the establishment of the Nationalist government in 1928, alongside the growth of the Communist Party.31
Nationalist control of much of China gradually gave way to invading forces from Japan. The Japanese ruled the northern and
eastern portions of China—including Shanghai and, most brutally, nearby Nanjing—for nearly a decade.32 Four years of uncertainty and civil war followed the departure of the Japanese.33
Then came the quarter-century of Mao Zedong’s rule, difficult
and often brutal years marked ultimately by the nationalization
of all land in China.34
This process of land nationalization started to reverse itself
with the death of Mao and the subsequent ascension to power of
Deng Xiaoping. A market-based economy began reappearing
during this time. The Chinese Constitution of 1982 was amended
in 1988 to allow for the creation of transferable land use rights,
and the Land Administration Law was adopted in 1986 and revised in 1998 and 2004.35 In his final years at China’s helm, Deng
sparked the re-ignition of China’s economy with his “reform and
30. The revolution “was triggered by an accidental bomb explosion” on October
9, 1911. JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 262 (1990) [hereinafter SPENCE, MODERN CHINA]. Puyi, the last emperor of the Qing Dynasty, abdicated on February 12, 1912. Id. at 267; PATRICIA BUCKLEY EBREY, THE
CAMBRIDGE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF CHINA 266 (1996) [hereinafter EBREY,
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY].
31. EBREY, CAMBRIDGE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 266–67, 273–78. For a discussion of the early days of the Chinese Communist Party, see JOHN KING FAIRBANK & MERLE GOLDMAN, CHINA: A NEW HISTORY 275–78 (enlarged ed. 1998)
[hereinafter FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, CHINA HISTORY]. For a discussion of Mao
Zedong’s rise, see id. at 301–05.
32. SPENCE, MODERN CHINA, supra note 30, at 443–83; EBREY, CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY, supra note 30, at 282, 284–86. A majority of China’s population lived in
land controlled by Japan. FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, CHINA HISTORY, supra note 31,
at 312.
33. SPENCE, MODERN CHINA, supra note 30, at 484–513; EBREY, CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY, supra note 30, at 286–90.
34. Although some Chinese land was nationalized immediately after the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, much of it was not, especially in urban
areas. As late as 1955, two-thirds of the housing stock in Shanghai still was provided
by the private sector. Yan Song, Gerrit Knaap & Chengri Ding, Housing Policy in
the People’s Republic of China: An Historical Review, in EMERGING LAND AND
HOUSING MARKETS IN CHINA 164 (Chengri Ding & Yan Song eds., 2005) [hereinafter LAND & HOUSING]. The final stages in the land nationalization process arguably
did not occur until six years after the death of Mao Zedong. RANDOLPH & LOU,
CREL, supra note 10, at 11 (observing that some Chinese scholars contend that the
nationalization of all land in China was not complete until 1982).
35. See infra notes 104–09 & accompanying text. See also Dale A. Whitman,
Chinese Mortgage Law: An American Perspective, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 35, 37–40
(2001) (offering a thorough and succinct summary of relevant Chinese real estate
law principles).
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opening” policy, and the Chinese economy has grown at
breakneck speed since the early 1990s. Having previously completed its nationalization of the ownership of all real property in
China, the government now took steps to allow private citizens
to control the use of land, by granting long-term land use rights
to those who wished to develop the real estate.
Shanghai, a major international city that had been stuck in
neutral for decades, began to re-emerge during the 1990s. In the
years since Deng catalyzed the reopening of China’s economic
system, Shanghai has seen the construction of twelve buildings
that are more than 225 meters in height, including Jin Mao
Tower, the tallest building in mainland China and the fifth tallest
in the world (at least for a short while longer).36 The government
initiated the development of the Pudong New Area, just across
the Huangpu River from downtown Shanghai, in effect building
a city about the size of Chicago in less than fifteen years right
next to the previously existing city of Shanghai.37 Shanghai is
stunning not just for its new steel-and-glass structures or its handful of signature skyscrapers, but for its unbelievable number of
ordinary thirty- and forty-story buildings packed together. It is a
city both vertical and horizontal, expanding relentlessly upward
and outward at the same time and at an ever-accelerating pace.38

36. Emporis Buildings, Buildings – Official World’s 200 Tallest High-rise Buildings, http://www.emporis.com/en/bu/sk/st/tp/wo/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). The five
tallest buildings in the world currently are Taipei 101 (Taipei, Taiwan); Petronas
Towers 1 and 2 (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia); the Sears Tower (Chicago, Illinois); and
Shanghai’s Jin Mao Tower, which tops out at 421 meters. Id. Of the world’s 200
tallest buildings, 22 are in New York, 17 are in Hong Kong, and 12 each are in
Shanghai and Chicago. Id. Emporis ranks Shanghai’s skyline as the world’s sixth
most impressive, behind those of Hong Kong, New York, Seoul, Chicago, and Singapore, using a somewhat arbitrary formula that assigns progressively larger numbers
of points for taller and taller buildings. Emporis Buildings, Buildings – Emporis
Skyline Ranking, http://www.emporis.com/en/bu/sk/st/sr/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
37. In the late 1980s, Pudong was a relatively inaccessible area east of Shanghai’s Huangpu River, occupied mainly by farms, warehouses, and scattered residences. See TIM CLISSOLD, MR. CHINA: A MEMOIR 243 (2004) (recalling seeing
water buffalo in Pudong in the early 1990s). On April 18, 1990, the National People’s Congress announced that the Pudong area would be developed at a rapid pace,
“to make Pudong one of the international centers for economy, finance and trade, to
open up further the cities along the Yangtze River . . . so as to accelerate to a new
stage the development of the Yangtze River Delta and the regions along the river.”
PUDONG YEARBOOK 2004, supra note 7, at 8. By 2003, Pudong had been
redeveloped into a modern and largely urbanized area with 2.7 million permanent
residents.
38. “[T]otal housing investment in Shanghai in 1997 was more than 190 times
that in 1978.” Xing Quan Zhang, Development of the Chinese Housing Market, in
LAND & HOUSING, supra note 34, at 183.
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III. THE OWNERSHIP ENTITY
A. THE STRUCTURE

OF THE

OWNERSHIP ENTITY

Most real estate projects in Shanghai are domestically
owned, primarily in the form of limited liability companies.39
The first task of a newly formed limited liability company is to
acquire land use rights, which are devices by which a unit of government permits private control and development of land without technically conveying ownership.40 In many cases, the entity
that obtains the land use right is itself partly owned by a private
developer-manager and partly owned by a government entity.41
This structure often results from the fact that a local government
entity42 controls the use of the land that the developer needs and
provides the land use right to the ownership entity as its contribution to that entity.43 In other words, the local government
controls an essential ingredient—the land use right—and uses its
control of that asset as a means of gaining an ownership interest
in the entity that will develop the land.
By making an in-kind contribution to the ownership entity,
the government retains partial ownership in the project, a fact
39. Limited liability companies are formed in accordance with the Company
Law, which was adopted in 1993 and modified in 1999 and 2005. Gongsi fa [Company Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29,
1993, revised Dec. 25, 1999 and Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), arts. 23–76
(2006) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Company Law]. See generally CHEN, INTRODUCTION,
supra note 24, at 245 (discussing earlier version of law). In addition to allowing for
the creation of limited liability companies, the Company Law also provides for the
establishment of joint stock limited companies. Company Law, arts. 77–146 (2006).
See generally JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK 128–31 (2d ed. 2005)
[hereinafter ZIMMERMAN, DESKBOOK] (translating the name of the latter entity as
“company limited by shares”; discussing earlier version of law). The minimum registered capital requirements for joint stock limited companies are much higher than
the parallel requirements for limited liability companies, which probably helps to
explain why real estate entities generally are formed as limited liability companies.
Compare Company Law, art. 26 (2006), with id., art. 81 (2006).
40. See infra Part VI for a detailed discussion of the land use right and its legal
basis.
41. Article 27 of the Law on the Administration of Urban Real Estate seems to
permit such a structure. Chengshi fangdichan guanli fa [Law on the Administration
of Urban Real Estate] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995), art. 27 (1995) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Law on Admin. of Urban Real Estate].
42. In many cases, there are significant differences in authority and policy
among local governments at the city and county level, provincial and municipal governments, and the central government. In cases where this difference is significant,
such as in the text reference here, I am careful to refer to a specific level of government. When I use the more generic term “government,” I am intentionally using it
more inclusively to refer to government at any level.
43. See Company Law, art. 27 (2006) (stating that a shareholder of a limited
liability company may make its capital contribution by “contributing such non-currency property as . . . land-use rights” and requiring that these rights be appraised).
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that allows the local government both to retain control over the
development and to profit from it.44 The other partner provides
the professional know-how and much of the cash. It appears that
the size of the fractional interest in the ownership entity that local governments demand has been dropping over time—one expert suggested that the percentage of a typical project owned by
the government partner has dropped from 60% to 40%—and
that many of these joint ventures are now controlled by the private party. Similarly, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) sometimes
receive land use rights from local governments at little or no cost,
or already own them, and then contribute these rights to a development entity that they jointly own with a local developer or,
occasionally, a foreign partner.
This government participation45 in real estate ventures is not
surprising, for several reasons. In the earliest days of the modern
Chinese real estate market, SOEs or the government itself had to
jump-start the development industry, as there simply was no one
else with any expertise.46 Even as China’s real estate industry
has matured and private entities have acquired the experience
and confidence necessary to take more prominent roles in the
development process, there are many reasons for the government to continue to invest. China’s real estate market is booming, particularly in the larger cities in the eastern part of the
country, and government entities wish to ride the real estate
wave to huge profits.47
SOEs, which generally are inefficient and lag in their operations as compared to other businesses, have recently been attempting to diversify into this successful industry to improve
their overall performance. Since SOEs historically have comprised part of the “iron rice bowl” social service network, often
44. One pair of commentators indicates that political units have theoretically
been prohibited from profiting from real estate development in this manner since
1990. RANDOLPH & LOU, CREL, supra note 10, at 132–34. However, several of the
experts I interviewed referred rather matter-of-factly to the current existence of
these types of public-private real estate joint ventures.
45. Also note that most banks operating in China are government-owned or controlled. As a result, approval of real estate loans may be motivated as much by
the government lender’s desire to implement its own national policy as by its desire
to be repaid with interest.
46. This pattern differs somewhat from that displayed by manufacturing ventures, in which foreign companies felt more comfortable forming joint ventures with
Chinese enterprises and entering the Chinese market earlier. Perhaps foreign companies believed that manufacturing goods in China would be less different from
manufacturing goods elsewhere than developing real estate in China would be from
developing real estate elsewhere.
47. But see infra notes 93–97 & accompanying text (suggesting that some of
these profits may be coming at the expense of rural peasants, a fact that has been
leading to growing unrest in the countryside).
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providing workers with a guaranteed job, housing, schools, and
health care, the government wants these entities to survive.48 If
an SOE fails, either the government must step in and provide
these benefits or the SOE’s former employees will suffer the type
of reduction in comfort and security that can lead to more generalized social unrest.49 Nonetheless, the rapid increase in the
number of private businesses and the quick growth in foreign
trade has caused some SOEs to fail, which places the government
in the position of having to sell off a bankrupt enterprise’s assets.
To the extent those assets include desirable real estate, the government may wish to profit from this newly available investment
opportunity, thereby increasing the SOE’s salvage value.50
By co-owning the development entity, the government also
is able to exert significant control over the construction process
and the ultimate product. One speaker suggested to me that
most of the residential real estate developers in Shanghai are entirely state-owned: The local government forms entities that it
owns or controls and then directs prime land to them. Naturally,
all of this government participation in the real estate industry
makes it more difficult for private companies to compete.
Much like the SOEs, private companies with a primary emphasis in industries other than real estate are seeking to diversify
48. “Because the large SOEs are responsible for many aspects of the lives of
their workers, reforming them presents social and political as well as economic challenges. Dismantling them would threaten to throw huge numbers of workers into
unemployment, and a nationwide safety net does not exist.” LUBMAN, BIRD IN A
CAGE, supra note 8, at 107.
The responsibility for housing workers that is borne by the SOEs reflects the
belief, now becoming discredited in China, that housing for workers is not a commodity but rather is a necessary cost of manufacturing a product. Jean Jinghan
Chen & David Wills, Pioneer Urban Housing Reform in China, in LAND, PROPERTY
& CONSTRUCTION, supra note 5, at 123 (“Traditionally, housing in China has been
viewed as a non-useful cost of production that must be borne to produce the truly
valued output which consists of manufactured goods.”). While the government may
want SOEs to continue to provide housing and other benefits to their workers, the
cost of furnishing these services renders SOEs uncompetitive in global markets. Id.
at 125 (“The housing burden of the SOEs has been one of the fundamental reasons
for their inefficiency and their incurred production losses.”).
49. “The one indignity the Chinese people will not tolerate is the destruction of
their savings. The population’s unspoken truce with the country’s autocratic leaders
has long been that they must continue to deliver improved living standards in return
for maintaining power.” JOE STUDWELL, THE CHINA DREAM: THE ELUSIVE QUEST
FOR THE GREATEST UNTAPPED MARKET ON EARTH 278 (2002) [hereinafter
STUDWELL, CHINA DREAM].
50. If the government has already established a land use plan covering this land,
it now has an incentive and the capability to ignore this plan. One expert suggested
to me that a major reason for the failure of land use planning in so many parts of
China is the conflicting stimuli affecting government entities in this situation: Faced
with the desire to implement a much-needed land use plan and the ability to profit
from the real estate boom, Chinese government entities often choose the latter. See
infra note 129 & accompanying text.
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their portfolios, and real estate has proved to be one of the most
successful investment sectors during the last several years. The
government, reluctant to allow competition from these wealthy
private entities, has begun to limit the ability of these companies
to operate in the real estate arena. It even has taken steps to
encourage these companies to sell their real estate assets to stateowned real estate holding companies, so that the government
rather than the private former owner can enjoy the future profits
from the real estate.
B. THE IMPORTANCE

OF

PERSONAL CONNECTIONS

Local governments sometimes convey a land use right to a
public-private joint venture ownership entity for less than the
land is worth.51 The entity then can quickly resell a portion of
the land use right at a higher price per square meter and recoup
some or all of its total cash investment in the project before it
begins construction. The end result of this two-step transaction is
that the entity can obtain the right to develop its remaining land
for free or at a steep discount. This suggests that the private coowner of the entity often is someone with close connections to
the government, such as a former government official, or that the
private partner has otherwise induced the government entity to
sell the land initially at a bargain price.
Land has become the hottest of commodities in many parts
of China, and government units that wish to profit from developing land may lack the necessary expertise. Those professionals
who possess this know-how and are willing to share the spoils
with the government—or certain workers within the government—are more likely to obtain the coveted land use rights.
Even in cases in which there is no outright corruption, developers and lawyers who master the nuances of an ever-changing legal and administrative system and maintain cordial relations with
the bureaucrat whose approval is essential hold a huge advantage
over their competitors. Given how rapidly China’s business laws
are developing and how sporadically and inconsistently they are
applied, guanxi is likely to remain an important factor in these
business dealings for the foreseeable future.
In recent years, however, fair public auctions have become
far more common, as various levels of Chinese government en51. Keep in mind that the concept of land’s “worth” is a sticky one in a nation in
which the real estate market is nascent. Land use rights, which are already time
delimited, have been available on the market for only a brief time. Moreover, the
land that the government is offering is land that has not been privately held in recent
years. This uncertainty about the land’s value is compounded by the overall volatility of China’s young real estate markets.
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deavor to fend off charges of corruption. I was regularly told by
different players in the Shanghai real estate market that that city
runs one of the cleanest operations in China52 and that auctions
of land use rights have become fairly transparent and open during the past several years.53
Even if procedures in parts of China are becoming more fair
and transparent, the early developers—the initial beneficiaries of
a system that rewarded guanxi even more overtly—still have a
huge competitive edge. By building their projects at a time when
the market was difficult to enter without connections, they became the market leaders. Their connections afforded them the
opportunity to obtain the experience and skills that they and
others lacked. This newfound expertise complements their personal contacts and allows these industry leaders to maintain their
head-start to a degree that later market entrants have had difficulty reducing.
Some of these early developers, having benefited from the
Wild West real estate environment of the 1990s, may have encouraged the adoption of legal changes to make the rules more
fair: Having established a huge lead, they now wished to lock in
their advantage by ensuring that no one else can ever do what
they succeeded in doing when the rules were more lax.54 Many
real estate transactions today are limited to those developers
with demonstrated success and the proven capacity to finance
and construct major projects, a group that largely consists of
those who could acquire land use rights under the more opaque
procedures prevalent in the initial days of the current boom.
And if guanxi is not as essential as it once was, it surely does not
52. See, e.g., Jamie P. Horsley, Shanghai Advances the Cause of Open Government Information in China, China Law Center, Yale Law School, available at http://
www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Shanghai_Advances.pdf, at 3 (last visited Mar. 7,
2007) (noting ways in which Shanghai has been making urban planning and redevelopment processes more transparent). See also YATSKO, NEW SHANGHAI, supra note
4, at 216 (“Western investors . . . often comment that Shanghai authorities follow the
rules compared with Chinese officials in the provinces, particularly in southern
China. . . . They also find Shanghai to be a relatively ethical place to do business,
particularly compared with southern China”). But see James T. Areddy, Corruption
Crackdown Targets Shanghai Inc.: Beijing Sends Signal, Stalling Glitzy Projects of
City’s Ousted Chief, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2007, at A1 (discussing firing and detention
of Chen Liangyu, Shanghai’s Communist Party Secretary, following allegations of
“mismanagement and theft . . . , influence peddling and other misdeeds”).
53. For a discussion of how Shanghai has modified its procedures for transferring land use rights, see infra notes 119–22 & accompanying text.
54. Interestingly, one of the Chinese people I interviewed compared the advantage enjoyed by these early entrants with guanxi to the one he perceives the United
States as enjoying under the World Trade Organization. He suggested that those
who are “in the lead” cement their benefits by encouraging the enactment of facially
neutral rules that serve to institutionalize their advantage.
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hurt even today. These realities also help to explain why most
successful real estate developers in China are Chinese.
C. FOREIGN

AND

DOMESTIC INVESTORS

To the extent there is foreign investment in real estate ownership entities, it overwhelmingly comes from overseas Chinese
in places such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the United States.55
Multinational corporations also have entered the market recently. Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, and Citigroup are among
the well-known overseas entities that have made significant investments in Shanghai real estate during the past few years, often
in high profile locations such as the Lujiazui Trade and Finance
Zone of Shanghai’s Pudong New Area. But the government still
restricts the ability of foreigners to invest in real estate, especially
in commercial and luxury residential projects. The experts I
spoke with disagreed about whether the government has permitted any of these top-tier projects to be wholly foreign-owned.
One developer told me that these internationally known foreign
entities insist on owning their projects, while a real estate agent
insisted that the first-class office buildings in Pudong remain
state-owned, as the government continues to require public ownership as a means of controlling the development process and
making the money that results.
Moreover, in some areas that were less intensively developed before the current real estate boom, such as portions of
Pudong, the municipal government established first-level developers and conveyed the empty or nearly empty land to these
state-owned entities. These entities installed basic infrastructure,
subdivided the land, and conveyed the land use rights in the
smaller subdivided parcels to the parties that ultimately developed them or will do so. This process ensured that the government would profit from the increased value brought about both
by the installation of the infrastructure and by more general appreciation in land values, while also limiting competition among
sellers so as to maintain high prices. It also served to keep the
profits from the appreciation of this land within China, as foreign
entities would have lacked the ability to obtain land use rights in
the first instance. The municipal government played a role similar to that of a subdivider in an American residential development, but with the added advantages of being able to monopolize
most or all of the land while also controlling its permissible uses.
General contractors sometimes serve as joint owners of real
estate entities as well. This may sound like good investment fore55. This Article employs a definition of “overseas Chinese” that includes Chinese residents of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau.
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sight by builders who hope to profit from the ownership of the
project and not solely from the construction process, and in some
cases it may be precisely that. More often, though, this appears
to be a form of developer financing. In the earlier days of the
modern Chinese real estate market—which is to say, a few years
ago—cash-strapped developers often would pay their contractors
very slowly. In effect, they were forcing these contractors to extend interest-free loans, by having them contribute materials and
labor for which they would not receive payment for months.
And if the project failed, the contractors would become unwilling
partners in the risk, as they would be unlikely to receive payment
at all.
The government, in one of many efforts to slow what it
feared was becoming a real estate bubble, has placed restrictions
on the ability of owner entities to pay their contractors slowly.
The intent is to ensure that developers have cash on hand before
incurring contractual obligations to their contractors. If it works,
this policy will mean that developers are more stable financially
and that contractors are more likely to be paid for their work.
Developers, however, have quickly learned to evade the effect of
these restrictions by bringing their contractors in as minority coowners. The contractor’s provision of materials and labor presumably is viewed not as its performance under a contract, for
which payment is due, but rather as its contribution to the entity,
for which it has already received consideration in the form of its
minority interest in the entity.
This discussion of ownership entities cannot be considered
complete without a brief discussion of the Wenzhounese. In the
early days of China’s new real estate market, most citizens gave
little thought to investing in land and buildings. The concept was
simply an alien one to the hundreds of millions of people emerging from nearly half a century of strict Communist rule and collective ownership of property. Residents of Wenzhou, in
Zhejiang Province on the nation’s east coast, were ahead of the
real estate investment curve and were among the first Chinese
citizens to begin investing in the young market.56 Wenzhounese
would collect money via “the tin plate,” effectively passing the
hat to amass sufficient funds to buy a project together. These
rudimentary joint ventures helped to spark the real estate market
at a time when most other investors chose to hold back or never
dreamed of investing in real estate in the first place. They also
established a disproportionate number of Wenzhounese as lead56. See STUDWELL, CHINA DREAM, supra note 49, at 34–37 (describing
Wenzhou’s economic rise since the 1980s and attributing it to a combination of individual resourcefulness and geographic isolation).
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ers in the real estate industry. When other Chinese saw how well
these Wenzhounese investors were faring, the real estate market
began to take off more broadly.
IV. CHOOSING A SITE: LOCATION, LOCATION,
INDUCEMENT, COMPULSION
A. PROFIT MOTIVE

AND

GOVERNMENT CONTROL

In China’s socialist market economy, the decision about
where to build is resolved, not surprisingly, by a combination of
private profit motive and government inducement or compulsion. Developers seek to buy land use rights and then build
structures on that land in locations that will be profitable. The
government simultaneously uses its power—including both its
ownership of the underlying land and its position as an equity
holder in many developer entities—as a means of channeling development where it wishes. To the extent that the government
hopes to force development of areas that are sparsely populated,
it also benefits from the business reality that it is far more advantageous for private developers to build on land from which developers will not have to remove current occupants and structures, a
process that can be both controversial and expensive.57
The profit motive of real developers requires no explanation
and seems to cross international cultural barriers with little need
for translation. The developers I interviewed generally wish to
make money and seemed a bit surprised that an American would
see any need to ask a Chinese developer about this. These professionals also recognize that they are working in an environment
that is heavily regulated. Thus, I sought to understand the goals
and mechanisms of China’s land use controls.
B. GOVERNMENT PLANNING

AND

PUBLIC INPUT

Chinese government entities do engage in land use planning
and zoning. While China’s methods of regulating land use are
not the principal topic of this Article, it is fair to summarize these
processes by stating that the government’s land use plans are developed in a top-down manner, with little or no citizen input.58
57. See infra note 100 & accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Chengshi guihua fa [City Planning Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, effective Apr. 1, 1990), art. 4
(1990) (P.R.C.) (“The state shall guide itself by the principle of strictly controlling
the size of large cities and developing medium-sized and small cities to an appropriate extent in the interest of a rational distribution of productive forces and of the
population.”); id. art. 6 (1990) (“The compilation of the plan for a city shall be based
on the plan for national economic and social development”); id. art. 11 (1990)
(describing “the compilation of hierarchical urban plan[s] for the whole nation”).
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In nearly every conversation I had, I asked my Chinese counterparts if they could provide me with an example of citizen input
into any aspect of land use planning. In three months of interviews, they provided me with only one concrete illustration: The
dramatic 360° circular exit ramp on the Puxi side of Shanghai’s
new Nanpu Bridge was suggested to planners by a twelve-yearold girl. As one Western lawyer succinctly explained to me, the
Chinese government has much more power to force things than
in the United States.59
One expert advised me that some government entities do
invite public comment, but that citizens’ suggestions are followed
only rarely. Rejecting or discouraging input from the very people who will be most affected by land use regulations surely must
hamper government planning efforts. Nonetheless, the government has become more keenly attuned to the need for better
land use planning and environmental control in recent years.
Even a government-mandated plan may be preferable to haphazard and aimless construction; even a government that is indisposed to follow citizen input will get it right sometimes. A
Chinese lawyer also told me that citizen input may have more
impact regarding changes to existing land use plans than initial
plans. This implies that the government will not listen to its citizens until after it has mis-stepped once on its own and needs advice on how to correct course.
Recently, the land use planning process has become more
transparent, though hardly more citizen-based. Shanghai, for instance, engages in multiple levels of planning. The first step is
“Open Planning,” in which Shanghai’s municipal government
makes a proposal that must be approved by both the Shanghai
Municipal People’s Congress and the State Council. Following
The City Planning Law does not appear to require public input at any point during
the planning process.
59. One Chinese real estate consultant told me that “people in China don’t like
to give suggestions. They think the government will do everything. So the people
don’t have the motivation.” Another possible explanation is that because citizen
input has been devalued for so many years, China’s citizens are simply unfamiliar
with the concept. Numerous conversations with my own students—who seemed baffled by the idea of citizen input into government decisions of any type—have persuaded me that this may be an important factor in the lack of citizen involvement in
the land use planning process. Shanghai’s residents still may be gun-shy, as well. In
the past, those who offered suggestions that contradicted the plans of government
officials often came to regret it, so local residents may have decided that the best
course is to remain unobtrusive.
Cf. Jamie P. Horsley, Village Elections: Training Ground for Democratization,
CHINA BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 44, 51 (tracing increases in citizen participation since the early 1980s and describing process as “the world’s largest grassroots
democratic education process,” but also noting continuing need for “nurturing a society that understands the rights and responsibilities of citizens in a modern state”).

\\server05\productn\P\PBL\24-1\PBL101.txt

24

unknown

Seq: 24

PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL

9-MAY-07

15:16

[Vol. 24:1

successful completion of this step, the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (or, for less significant projects, the Shanghai
Urban Planning Administration, an administrative arm of the
municipal government) specifies requirements for individual
blocks of land. Subsequent rezonings, while occasionally available, are difficult to obtain. Then, in the third step, technical specifications are proposed for individual buildings. Steps four and
five consist of bidding on the transfer of specific land use rights
and the execution of a contract with the successful bidder.60
These steps appear to mirror to some degree the land use process
in the United States, although the Chinese process provides virtually no opportunity for input from outside the government,
even by those considering bidding.
In the first days of Shanghai’s real estate boom, potential
real estate developers could become involved in the planning
process even earlier. Back in the 1990s, the government would
ask developers to find a block and propose a real estate development for that block. Developers then could locate land they
wished to develop and pitch their proposals to the government.
This method is rarely used today. Rather, the government either
makes its planning decisions in the manner described above and
invites proposals from developers who must comply with these
detailed specifications, or it invites proposals for specific blocks
that it has designated but not yet planned in great detail so that
the developer can participate in the later stages of the planning
process. By relying on these latter methods today, the government maintains additional control over land use policy and also
retains a greater ability to slow down an already overheated real
estate market.
C. POPULATION DISPERSAL
Shanghai also has sought recently to reduce population density in its urban core and promote new development in outlying
areas of the vast municipality.61 The Shanghai government previously had set up satellite communities as commuter towns in re60. See infra notes 119–22 & accompanying text (discussing Shanghai’s process
for transferring land use rights).
61. Shanghai Municipality covers 6,340.5 square kilometers, but only about onethird of this area is urbanized. The remainder of the municipality’s area is used in a
variety of ways, including as agricultural land and forests. Population density in
Shanghai ranges from 50,939 persons per square kilometer in the downtown
Huangpu district to only 615 persons per square kilometer in outlying Chongming
County. Basic Facts – Changes In The City’s Population, http://www.shanghai.gov.
cn/shanghai/node8059/BasicFacts/PopulationandEmployment/userobject22ai8465.
html (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). I occasionally observed small farms tucked in between heavily developed urban areas along the road connecting downtown Shanghai
and the outlying Minhang District.
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mote and more thinly populated portions of Shanghai. As the
populations of these outlying townships has swelled and automobile traffic downtown has become a huge problem, the government has accelerated the dispersal process still further by trying
to relocate selected industries to these satellite towns. The municipal government’s hope is that these satellite towns will become larger and more self-sustaining, with residents working in
the local industry rather than commuting downtown. Vehicular
traffic may continue to increase, but at least it will be more
decentralized.
The Songjiang area of Shanghai, for example, has been designated as a base for the electronics industry. As a result of this
policy, Songjiang is expected to house one million people in just
a few years. The Shanghai Planning Museum, a fascinating combination of historical exhibits and chamber-of-commerce-style
boosterism, portrays detailed plans for the development of outlying Chongming Island—the third largest island in China and a
portion of Shanghai Municipality—as an environmentally
friendly planned community.
Government compulsion sometimes is more direct. In the
early years of the Pudong development, the municipal government aimed to transform the Lujiazui area into a center of banking and finance and the Jinqiao area into a residential nucleus for
expatriates living in Shanghai. To this end, the government informed foreign banks that they could obtain business licenses
only if their offices were physically located in Lujiazui. International schools received similar directives and were instructed to
operate in Jinqiao. These efforts to control land use succeeded in
accomplishing their goals. Lujiazui is rapidly becoming Shanghai’s Lower Manhattan,62 and the Jinqiao area now is home to
approximately twenty international schools, which in turn serve
as a magnet for foreigners. Similarly, the government indirectly
financed Pudong’s pioneer urban residents by selling land use
rights at relative bargain prices. Not only was the government
paying the huge costs of the massive infrastructure development
needed in this previously rural region’s early days, it also was
subsidizing those considering moving to the area.
D. GOVERNMENT USE

OF

INCENTIVES

Developers sometimes need even stronger coercion because
some projects simply are not economically feasible standing on
their own. Two professionals separately explained to me how an
62. A 1984 academic article on display at the “Pudong 15” exhibit at Pudong
Exhibition Hall, which celebrates the fifteenth anniversary of the opening up of
Pudong, is entitled, Where is Shanghai’s Manhattan?
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overseas Chinese developer was induced to spearhead the redevelopment of the older Shanghai neighborhood that is now the
upscale Xintiandi shopping area. At the time the idea was first
hatched, the developer believed the project to be infeasible.
Shanghai’s government sweetened the pot by offering this company additional choice land elsewhere in the city; the value of
this extra property apparently was sufficient to change the developer’s mind. Once again, the municipal government provided an
indirect subsidy, and the market—goosed by these government
incentives—got the job done.
Just as it may increase inducements when it wants an area to
blossom, the government also can reduce incentives or coercion
if it wishes for development in an area to cool. After fifteen
years of encouraging or forcing development in Pudong, the
Shanghai government appears to recognize that at least some
sections of this area’s real estate economy may have overheated.
The district government of Pudong, which had been permitted to
retain money raised from the sale of land use rights within the
district for construction of infrastructure projects there, apparently will soon be required to remit this money to the Shanghai
municipal government. The Pudong district government thus
will have fewer resources available to channel development
within the district, while Shanghai’s municipal government will
increase its ability to use profits from the sale of land use rights
in parts of Pudong to target neighborhoods elsewhere in the municipality. In addition, the central and municipal governments
have used tax policy and interest rate adjustments as a means of
controlling the level of expansion of the real estate market more
broadly.
E. CONFLICTS BETWEEN
THE

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
PROVINCES

THE

AND

The previous example illustrates the potential for conflict
between the government of a municipality and the government
of a district within that municipality. But an even larger problem
is the possibility of disagreements between a province or a municipality and the central government. Many of the provinces
and municipalities profit significantly from the granting of land
use rights. These lower-level governments retain seventy percent
of the proceeds from sales of land use rights, remitting the other
thirty percent to Beijing.63 Since there is no system of ad
63. Tudi guanli fa [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 25, 1986, revised Dec. 29, 1988, Aug. 29, 1998 &
Aug. 28, 2004, effective Aug. 28, 2004), art. 55 (2004) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Land
Admin. Law].
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valorem property taxation in China,64 the municipalities fund a
significant portion of their ongoing operations from the sale of
land use rights. These government entities also benefit from the
increased income taxes they can collect down the road if the land
is ultimately used in a productive way. So it is greatly to the benefit of these lower-level government entities to keep the real estate market booming for as long as possible: The more land that
developers want to buy and the higher the going price, the more
money these government entities will collect to fund their ongoing operations and their massive capital expenditures.65
Although the central government receives its portion of the
sale proceeds, it has its own reasons to fear unremitting land
price appreciation. As urban residential prices continue to increase at a rate faster than that at which urban salaries are rising,
there is growing concern that fewer and fewer of the urban residents who do not already own their homes will be able to afford
to buy units, leading to unhappiness among those priced out of
the residential real estate market. Meanwhile, if the urban real
estate bubble ever bursts, those who have succeeded in buying
their own homes and riding the residential real estate wave may
not like where it deposits them. Either way, the government in
Beijing enjoys only a small portion of the benefit of the real estate boom but will likely bear the brunt of any citizen unrest that
might materialize from it.
The central government seems to be particularly concerned
about the preservation of agricultural land.66 The continued upswing in urban real estate markets threatens to dislocate peasants, and not just poorer urbanites, as cities expand inexorably
into undeveloped neighboring agricultural property. The central
government may be anxious about shortages of food in modern
China, although the nation currently seems quite capable of feeding itself and exporting surplus food.67 The government’s larger
64. While there is no general ad valorem property tax, certain similar taxes are
levied on profit-making enterprises. Government revenues from these taxes appear
to be relatively small. See Chengri Ding & Gerrit Knaap, Urban Land Policy Reform in China’s Transitional Economy, in LAND & HOUSING, supra note 34, at 16
(describing proceeds of one of these taxes as “so minimal that they barely reflected
land ownership”).
65. See id. at 21–22 (noting that as much as half of some cities’ revenues comes
from the sale of land use rights).
66. See, e.g., Land Admin. Law, arts. 4, 22, 24, 31, 33–34 (2004) (limiting conversion of agricultural land for construction purposes).
67. Cf. George C.S. Lin & Samuel P.S. Ho, China’s Land Resources and Land
Use Change, in LAND & HOUSING, supra note 34, at 94 & n.11 (quoting a study
finding that China’s cultivated land provides 88 percent of China’s food needs while
acknowledging that figures such as this one are unreliable; the authors note that
changes in dietary habits and farming technology might allow greater food production from less and less agricultural land); id. at 116 & n.28.
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worry seems to be the enormous potential for unrest in rural areas if peasants continue to lose land without having alternative
economic opportunities available to them.68
For rural residents, the land they cultivate is not just their
livelihood, but also their social security. If these residents lose
the use of the land they have been farming, the compensation
they receive may allow them to afford a newer and more modern
urban dwelling but probably will not provide them with an income during or after their working life. The ability of these former farmers to replace this income in an urban setting is likely to
be limited.69 And while several different people—including one
lifelong inhabitant of Pudong—suggested to me that long-time
residents of the formerly rural areas of Pudong are generally satisfied with the benefits that recent urbanization has brought, this
does not seem to be the case throughout China’s rural areas
more broadly.70 Beijing, understandably intent on squelching the
next peasant revolution before it begins, has insisted that there
be no net decrease in cultivable land.71
In a nation that abhors chaos more than it cares about the
protection of individual liberties, this concern about upheaval
may be the most important reason why the central government is
trying to tamp down the real estate market.72 But the government’s ability to succeed in restraining market forces is limited.
One expert informed me that the central government has placed
quotas on sales of land use rights on a province-by-province basis. Provinces with booming real estate markets, however, have
68. Professor Peerenboom notes, “Land disputes have become a major source
of unrest in rural China and indeed throughout China. The Land Bureau is the
leading defendant in administrative litigation suits, accounting for some 15 percent
of all such cases.” PEERENBOOM, LONG MARCH, supra note 2, at 482 (internal citations omitted).
69. One person I met with stated that compensation in these instances will include a lifetime income benefit, but others were more equivocal on this point. Several people indicated that former rural residents may qualify as urban residents after
relocation, which will allow them to obtain certain social welfare benefits for which
they previously were ineligible.
70. See, e.g., Howard W. French, Villagers Tell of Lethal Attack by Chinese
Forces on Protesters, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, § 1, at 3 (describing dispute over
compensation for the use of residents’ land in which security forces killed as many as
20 residents of the village of Dongzhou in “the deadliest use of force by Chinese
forces against citizens since the Tiananmen massacre in 1989”; the article notes that
residents compared the behavior of police to that of “Japanese occupiers of the last
century” and the “Chinese Nationalist Army of Chiang Kai-shek”).
71. See RANDOLPH & LOU, CREL, supra note 10, at 25–28.
72. But see How to Make China Even Richer, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2006, at
11 (suggesting that “it is the absence of reform that is proving destabilising, as peasants protest violently against land seizures by local governments keen to exploit the
land themselves.”). In other words, it is possible that peasants would gladly accept
compensation for their land if the amount they received more accurately reflected
the land’s true value on the open market.
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been permitted to purchase unused quota from other areas. This
overall process does serve to spread the wealth somewhat, with
booming locales such as Shanghai having to send some money to
less vigorous places such as Inner Mongolia in exchange for additional development quota. But it probably does not succeed in
reducing development in the more successful provinces to the extent the central government may have hoped.
Interestingly, another expert, from another part of China,
questioned whether transfers of quota were permissible. This
second expert concurred, however, that the entire effort at limiting real estate development is difficult for the central government to police. One professional informed me that the central
government has been taking satellite photos of agricultural areas
on a regular basis and examining them to confirm that cultivable
land is being used for agricultural purposes throughout the growing season and is not being used in other ways without the knowledge of the central government.
Although Beijing theoretically controls the nation’s land
market, lower levels of government have economic incentives to
see that market continue to blossom. These municipal and provincial governments profit greatly from the initial transfer of land
use rights and continue to benefit by imposing taxes on subsequent property transfers and income taxes on businesses that operate on this land. Lower levels of government have their
reasons for wanting to see the boom continue, and they use their
substantial control over local real estate markets to encourage
continued growth.
V. CLEARING THE LAND: DEMOLITION
AND RESETTLEMENT
A. CHINA’S SHORTAGE

OF

DEVELOPABLE LAND

The land mass of China is almost exactly the same size as
that of the United States, but China has more than four times the
population.73 A much larger proportion of China’s land area
consists of deserts and rugged mountains that are thinly populated and likely to remain that way. China’s interior areas are
much less accessible by ship or by rail than are those in
73. The CIA website lists China’s area as 9,596,960 square kilometers and its
2006 population as 1,313,973,713, CIA, The World Factbook – China, available at
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html (last visited Mar. 7,
2007); comparable numbers for the United States are 9,631,418 square kilometers
and 298,444,215 people, CIA, The World Factbook – United States, available at
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Mar. 7,
2007).
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America.74 So it is no wonder that the eastern part of China is
thickly inhabited and that there is little or no unused land in that
portion of the country—even rural areas are densely packed by
American standards.75 As a result, it is difficult to find a desirable site for any new project in or near China’s eastern cities that
will not require the relocation of existing residents, sometimes in
large numbers. Either the government or the developer must
relocate these residents, some of whom are likely to object strenuously. Real estate developers naturally prefer to work with vacant land whenever possible, but vacant land is hard to come by.
B. DEMOLISHING STRUCTURES

AND

RESETTLING RESIDENTS

The process of relocating current occupants of property and
demolishing existing structures is a complex and expensive one.
It has changed over time. And like everything else in China, it
arises from a combination of a small portion of written law and a
larger measure of interpretation by government officials with
much discretion.76 The topic of demolition and resettlement is
sufficiently complex that I intend to address it in far greater detail in another article. But a brief summary of the relocation process is necessary here, as demolition and resettlement comprises
such an important piece of so many real estate developments in
China today.77
74. “More than 20 percent of [China’s] land (e.g., deserts and land covered by
glaciers and/or snow) is unusable for any purpose; mountainous areas comprise another 30 percent of China’s territory.” Chengri Ding & Gerrit Knaap, Urban Land
Policy Reform in China’s Transitional Economy, in LAND & HOUSING, supra note
34, at 13 (2005). As a result, “China feeds more than 20 percent of the world’s
population on less than 7 percent of the world’s farmland.” Id. Note, though, that
statistics about the Chinese economy tend to be extremely unreliable, particularly
when they are furnished by Chinese government agencies. See, e.g., George C.S. Lin
& Samuel P.S. Ho, China’s Land Resources and Land Use Change, in LAND &
HOUSING, supra, at 89 & n.1 (quoting three different recent estimates of cultivated
land in China that vary from 94.97 to 160 million hectares).
75. See, e.g., Jean Jinghan Chen & David Wills, Introduction, in LAND, PROPERTY AND CONSTRUCTION, supra note 5, at 5 (estimating that over 90% of China’s
population lives in the eastern third of its land mass); George C.S. Lin & Samuel
P.S. Ho, China’s Land Resources and Land Use Change, in LAND & HOUSING, supra
note 34, at 92 (estimating that “more than 40 percent of the Chinese people live[ ] in
East China on less than 14 percent of the country’s total land area”).
76. To the extent that written laws apply, they are not always readily accessible.
See, e.g., PEERENBOOM, LONG MARCH, supra note 2, at 246 (noting, “The lack of
centralized records makes it difficult to know exactly what rules apply at any given
time in any given place”) (internal citations omitted). And even when applicable
written laws are available, they may be vague, as is often the case in other civil law
countries. Id. at 251.
77. For an excellent treatment of some of the problems with the current process
of demolition and relocation, see Chenglin Liu, Informal Rules, Transaction Costs,
and the Failure of the “Takings” Law in China, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
1 (2005) [hereinafter Liu, Informal Rules].
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All land in China technically is owned either by the state or
by agricultural collectives.78 However, because the state has the
power to expropriate land from agricultural collectives, the collectives own their land at the mercy of the state,79 and the state
has shown over the past decade that it is willing to requisition
agricultural land if it believes the land can be put to uses that are
more economically productive. The Chinese government thus effectively owns or controls all domestic land. Individuals or business entities may acquire land use rights from the government for
terms ranging up to seventy years and then may own a structure
or unit on that land.80
In urban areas, many of the residents living in older units
probably do not own either the units themselves or the underlying land use rights.81 Most likely, their housing has been provided to them by the government, their work unit, or,
occasionally, an agricultural collective that owns some land that
has become urbanized. These units are likely to be extremely old
and run-down.82 The occupants are entitled to compensation if
the government forces them to relocate. But as expert after expert emphasized to me, the amount they will receive—reflecting
the two realities of non-ownership of the land use right and poor
condition of the structure—will be minimal.
If the overall value of a housing unit is defined to include
both the value of a land use right to the land and the value of the
unit located on that land, one expert estimated for me that in a
typical requisition of this sort, the land use right represents 20%
78. In accordance with Marxist doctrine, individuals are not permitted to own
land in China. Keith McKinnell & Anthony Walker, China’s Land Reform and the
Establishment of a Property Market, in LAND, PROPERTY AND CONSTRUCTION, supra
note 5, at 31 (“According to Marxist theory, land is singled out as incapable of being
regarded as a commodity, since it is not a product of man’s labour - land exists by
itself.”).
79. PRC Constitution, art. 10 (2004). See RANDOLPH & LOU, CREL, supra
note 10, at 59 & nn.1–2, 73–74 & n.47. The central government may exercise ownership rights directly or may act through county and city governments as its surrogates.
It is generally these local-level governments that grant land use rights. Id. at 68–69.
80. See infra Part VI.
81. Chinese law appears to recognize “homestead” rights in free-standing
houses, although the legal status of these homestead rights is somewhat murky.
Homestead rights are not applicable to units in multiple-dwelling buildings, which is
where most urban Chinese live. See RANDOLPH & LOU, CREL, supra note 10, at
107–10.
82. Those urban occupants who have become owners are likely to own newer
and more modern units that were constructed after land use rights became marketable. These units, which are more valuable and more recently constructed, are far
less likely to be redeveloped—for the second time in the last ten or fifteen years—
than are older and shabbier units that usually are not owned by their occupants. At
the same time, some older units are now being sold or rented to their occupants
rather than being provided by work units as a benefit to their workers. These units
generally are less valuable and in poorer condition.

\\server05\productn\P\PBL\24-1\PBL101.txt

32

unknown

Seq: 32

PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL

9-MAY-07

15:16

[Vol. 24:1

of this overall value while the structure represents the other
80%. So the resident who is displaced may receive 80% of the
overall value of an old unit and then have to purchase 100% of
the value of a newer and more expensive unit, with the percentage increase reflecting the fact that the buyer now must purchase
the land use right as well as the unit built on it.
Given the poor quality of much of the older housing stock in
urban areas, residents may be all too happy to take this money—
either negotiated with the developer or forced on them by the
government—and move to a more inviting dwelling. In some
cases, occupants who settle with the government quickly receive
compensation bonuses of as much as 20%; in this way, the government hopes to induce potential holdouts to take the larger
sum early and relocate without a fight. But even with any settlement bonus, the amount of compensation they are likely to receive will seem modest in today’s competitive real estate market
and probably will require them to relocate to less expensive outlying areas of their city.83 Moreover, as a result of rapid price
appreciation, the longer these buyers wait to buy their new unit,
the less they will be able to afford.
In the earlier days of China’s new housing market, which is
to say a decade ago, the government typically paid compensation
in kind, providing relocatees with new apartments. Today, with a
more mature residential real estate market, a citizenry that has
quickly become more sophisticated about investing in residential
real estate, and a wider range of apartments available, these relocatees are more likely to receive cash compensation, which allows them greater personal choice of where to live. Either way,
the overall result of the relocation process in urban areas seems
to be the gradual displacement of poorer, long-time urban residents to more modern housing on the outer fringes of the city,
and their replacement downtown by more affluent purchasers
who can afford the rapidly increasing prices of homes in the urban center.84 In short, Chinese metropolitan areas seem to dis83. “‘It’s very good. Now I have five rooms. I have a kitchen and a toilet—
before we just used a chamber pot . . . . It’s a little far, but I like it.’” YATSKO, NEW
SHANGHAI, supra note 4, at 33 (quoting a former downtown resident forced to relocate to a Shanghai suburb after her original neighborhood was redeveloped). The
author continues by noting that this resident’s feelings are not universally shared by
relocatees. Id. at 34–36.
84. The amount of housing that is being developed or redeveloped in China
today is astonishing. According to one Chinese publication, “Housing construction
in urban and rural areas averaged 860 million square meters a year between 1985
and 1992. The peak year of 1988 saw more than 1 billion square meters of housing
completed.” THE CHINESE ECONOMY INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: FORECASTS AND
POLICIES 137 (Li Jingwen ed., 2000). This same publication lists the average living
space per person in 1992 as 18.9 square meters for rural residents and 6.9 square
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play characteristics that are the exact opposite of those of many
of their American counterparts, in which more affluent residents
have tended to move to the suburbs, abandoning the urban core
to the poor.
C. TRANSFERRING CLEARED LAND

TO

DEVELOPERS

Once the government has removed the existing occupants
from the land, it is in a position to transfer it to a developer. The
price the government can charge for land use rights on this newly
vacated land will reflect its, and the market’s, assessment of what
can now be built on the land and the ultimate rentable area of
the project. In addition, the government has succeeded in driving the price higher by going to the expense and inconvenience
of demolition and resettlement. As one expert stated to me,
“[The] land price is higher for clean land.” The government presumably profits greatly by taking the land at a price that reflects
its then-current use and conveying land use rights for more intensive uses at current market rates to developers who plan to construct higher-end housing or commercial projects.85 By
exercising its powers to remove the current users of the property,
assemble large development parcels, and allow more intensive
uses and densities, the government can enrich itself enormously,
a fact that many observers, along with some displaced residents,
find extremely troubling.86
In the earlier days of the modern Chinese real estate market,
however, the government occasionally was willing to bear much
of the business risk of a relocation and demolition project itself.
For example, if a high-profile foreign company wanted to invest
in specific land to build a manufacturing facility, it might contract
with the government for that parcel, to be delivered vacant at a
specified date in the future. The government then would apmeters for urban residents, id. at 182–83, which suggests that in excess of 350 million
Chinese are living in housing built during that single eight-year period. These staggering numbers are consonant with China’s goal of improving housing conditions for
all Chinese citizens. See, e.g., Law on Admin. of Urban Real Estate, art. 4 (1995)
(“The State shall . . . support the development of construction of residential houses
so as to gradually improve the housing conditions of residents.”).
85. While most of the experts with whom I raised this issue either stated or
implied that this is the case, one Chinese lawyer strenuously disagreed with this
assertion.
86. Of course, there is the possibility that the government will lose money if
property values decrease during the relevant time period. However, land prices in
China seem to have increased relentlessly during the past fifteen years. Besides, real
estate values would have to drop precipitously before the decrease would offset the
government’s built-in advantage in buying out occupants of run-down homes (many
of whom do not hold land use rights) and assembling large development parcels that
can thereafter be developed for more intensive uses by commercial developers (all
of whom will hold land use rights in this same property).
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proach the occupants and seek to relocate them at a negotiated
price. This process obviously entailed great risk to the government, as it would have already committed to a sales price before
knowing the actual cost of buying out the existing occupants.
The government presumably believed it would benefit in the long
run, in the form of higher tax revenues and increased economic
development in the area, even if it lost money on the specific real
estate transaction. This sequence of events has become far less
common as the Chinese real estate market has matured, the government has gained experience, and outside buyers have become
more anxious to acquire rights to develop land in China.
Several speakers emphasized that the government has become considerably more reluctant during the past few years to
requisition older homes for private commercial development,
whether before or after identifying the eventual developer for
the land. This hesitancy reflects the government’s concerns
about both business risk and public perception. Existing residents have grown savvier about holding out for higher compensation, and the government has been encouraging would-be
developers to deal with these holdouts directly, especially when
the number of holdouts is non-trivial. This shift places the financial hazard of ever-more-expensive buyouts on the developer
rather than on the government. If the deal balloons in price or
falls through completely, it is no longer the government’s problem. A number of blocks in Shanghai were obviously on their
way to being redeveloped, but with an occasional building still
standing, presumably occupied by a resident who had not yet
reached final agreement with the block’s developer. Private developers, meanwhile, sometimes acting through intermediary relocation companies, have occasionally resorted to intimidation
and violence as a means of encouraging these residents to reduce
their demands and leave quickly. In one recent Shanghai incident described for me by several different interviewees, a couple
was killed when their apartment was set on fire in an apparent
attempt to scare them into leaving.87
Moreover, while the government still technically holds the
right to requisition this land, public pressure has made these requisitions more and more unpopular. At a time of increasing real
estate prices and widespread worry about housing costs, the government does not wish to be perceived as assisting real estate
developers in enriching themselves by depriving poorer residents

87. Liu, Informal Rules, supra note 77, at 2 & n.5.
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of their long-time homes.88 Several of the experts who shared
their views on this topic with me expressed sympathy for the
plight of these poorer urban residents, along with concerns that
overall social instability might increase if these controversial land
requisitions continue.89 Nonetheless, many who are knowledgeable about the Shanghai real estate market believe that the government continues to assist real estate developers actively,
sometimes employing illegal techniques to do so.90
D.

SHANGHAI’S LAND RESERVE SYSTEM

Shanghai’s government recently has instituted a land reserve
system. Under this system, the government will relocate urban
residents from a block before a developer has been identified
and will stockpile this urban land. When the government later
chooses to release this land from its reserves, it will allow developers to bid for it competitively. The government establishes a
minimum price that allows it to recoup its earlier demolition and
relocation costs, although market-driven bids are likely to exceed
this minimum by a substantial amount, particularly if some time
has elapsed between the acquisition and the sale. This has become the most common method of assembling land in Shanghai
today. The land reserve method allows the government, rather
88. Some of the older buildings slated to be razed may have historical value as
well. There is growing, if still slight, support in China for historic preservation of
significant structures.
89. Even when the purpose of a land requisition is unquestionably public, the
removal of a resident from their home is controversial. Chinese citizens have protested publicly in front of government ministries and there have been cases of selfimmolation in Beijing. See, e.g., Farmer Sets Self on Fire at Tian’anmen Square,
CHINA DAILY, Sept. 15, 2003 (describing farmer as dissatisfied with relocation decision; article does not address legitimacy of farmer’s claim), available at http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-09/15/content_264285.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
See also Liu Li, City Denies Reports on Large-scale Evictions, CHINA DAILY, Mar.
11, 2004 (claiming that controversial evictions “are in tune with the capital city’s
long-term development, and are not merely for the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games”),
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/11/content_313666.
htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
Requisitions for purposes that are less obviously public raise even greater worries for the government. This distinction mirrors the public outcry over takings for
economic development in the Unites States. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545
U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that takings for purposes of economic development do not
violate the “public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment). I was in Shanghai
both before and after the Supreme Court decided Kelo, and my faculty colleagues
were following the case with great interest. Several of the experts I interviewed in
connection with this Article asked me extremely knowledgeable questions about
Kelo, with which they were quite familiar.
90. See, e.g., Joseph Kahn, Shanghai’s Party Leader, Mistrusted by Hu, Is
Purged, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at A8 (reporting on mixed motives for ousting
Chen Liangyu, Communist Party leader of Shanghai, including accounts that he had
profited from illegal real estate activities).
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than the developer, to take the initiative on land use planning. It
also divorces the process of requisitioning older housing stock
from the subsequent conveyance of the vacant land to a particular developer, a separation that may help to insulate the government from the charge that residents are being relocated at the
behest of a specific developer.
E. AGRICULTURAL COLLECTIVE LAND
Agricultural collective land poses a knottier problem, since
neither the agricultural collective itself nor the government may
grant land use rights to developers or homeowners on this land.
The government first must requisition it and convert it to stateowned land before the government can grant land use rights on
it.91 In this sense, China’s dual land market differs significantly
from that of the United States, in which there is a unitary market.
While the agricultural collective generally is entitled to compensation for its land when it is converted into state-owned land, it is
difficult to determine what rural land actually is worth since
there has been no true market in agricultural land in China for
more than half a century. Agricultural collective land also can be
requisitioned by the government and then granted back to the
collective in the form of a granted land use right. This process
allows the collective either to use the land for non-agricultural
purposes itself or to re-transfer the granted land use right to a
third party and enjoy the profit from its increased value for development purposes.92
Many of the people I met with argued that the government
is paying unfairly low amounts to the collectives for their farmland, by which they meant that the government is calculating fair
market value on the assumption that the highest and best use still
is agricultural.93 The collectives then typically provide the dis91. Law on Admin. of Urban Real Estate, art. 8 (1995) (“The land-use right for
the collective-owned land within a planned urban district may be granted with payment only after it is requisitioned in accordance with the law and turned into Stateowned land”).
92. RANDOLPH & LOU, CREL, supra note 10, at 134–35, 145–46. After Chinese
law began to recognize granted land use rights, allocated land use rights were defined as land use rights that a user obtained free of charge. Id. at 86. Allocated land
use rights ordinarily have an indefinite term as long as the stated use for which the
right was granted continues. Law on Admin. of Urban Real Estate, art. 22 (1995);
RANDOLPH & LOU, CREL, supra, at 91. The indefinite term and lack of required
consideration characteristic of an allocated land use right reflect its origin as part of
the socialist planned economy. Id. at 89.
93. Article 47 of the Land Administration Law provides that compensation for
requisitioned agricultural collective land shall be equal to six to ten times the average annual crop output during the preceding three years, plus additional amounts
for resettlement, fixtures, and crops not yet harvested. Land Admin. Law, art. 47
(2004). Provincial and lower-level governments may increase these totals to main-
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placed farmers with either cash or in-kind compensation; in some
cases, the farmers may be relocated to other collectives. Once
the land has been transferred from the collective to the state, the
government then can grant land use rights on it to developers at
much higher prices—values that now reflect the fact that residential or commercial development has become the new highest and
best use.
In short, the government is profiting, at the expense of agricultural peasants, from changing patterns of land use and its own
unique power to transform undevelopable farmland into developable urban land.94 This process roughly mirrors the method
for clearing urban land that is occupied by older housing, with
the added complication that the displaced residents are farmers
and thus are losing their livelihood as well as their home.95 Sevtain living standards, but the adjusted total for land compensation and resettlement
expenses may not exceed thirty times the average annual crop output during the
preceding three years unless the State Council raises the rates due to special circumstances. Id. (2004). These valuation options all reflect what the land is worth as
farmland and not the fair market value as determined by a negotiated transfer between willing participants. If the prospective buyer expects to develop the land
more intensively, the land almost certainly is worth considerably more to this buyer
than its value as determined by Article 47.
94. See, e.g., Anthony Gar-on Yeh, The Dual Land Market and Urban Development in China, in LAND & HOUSING, supra note 34, at 43 (“Because the municipality
monopolizes the supply of this type of land, it can acquire rural land from farmers at
a monopolistic price and sell it to developers at market price. A municipality can
make a considerable profit because of the great difference between land-acquisition
and land-lease prices.”); William Valletta, The Land Administration Law of 1998 and
Its Impact on Urban Development, in LAND & HOUSING, supra, at 67 (“In many
requisition deals a large windfall of new value resulted from the reclassification of
the land [from rural to urban]. The requisition procedure was designed to capture
all of this value for the state or municipality.”).
General concerns about the upheaval that might be caused by the loss of agricultural land to real estate development appear to have led to the amendments to
the Land Administration Law that became effective in 1999. Id. at 69. These
changes require comprehensive land use planning at all levels of government and
make it more difficult for lower-level government entities to modify permitted land
uses. Land Admin. Law, arts. 8, 12, 17–20, 24 (2004); RANDOLPH & LOU, CREL,
supra note 10, at 136–38.
95. Keep in mind that in the United States, 0.7% of the labor force is engaged in
“farming, forestry, and fishing,” CIA – The World Factbook – United States, available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Mar. 7,
2007), while in China, the percentage of the labor force engaged in “agriculture” is
45%, CIA – The World Factbook – China, available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/ch.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). Even if these categories are not defined in precisely the same way, it is clear that a vastly higher proportion of the Chinese population leads a life that revolves around agricultural
production. And the education, literacy, and social gaps between urban and rural
dwellers are much greater in China than in the United States.
Over the next two decades, as many as 300 million Chinese may move from
rural areas to cities. Chengri Ding & Gerrit Knaap, Urban Land Policy Reform in
China’s Transitional Economy, in LAND & HOUSING, supra note 34, at 32. These
approximate numbers were confirmed for me by numerous real estate professionals
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eral different experts advised me that disagreement over how to
handle the ongoing problem of compensating farmers fairly is
largely responsible for the delay in the adoption of China’s in
rem property law, which has been under discussion for years.96
Even more worrisome to those concerned about the unfairness of these relocation policies is the fact that the profits the
government extracts from the agricultural collectives often are
used to fund government operations that primarily benefit the
urban core. Some professionals bluntly view this process as a
transfer of wealth from poor peasants living in outlying collectives to wealthy downtown city dwellers. Furthermore, agricultural workers, who are not considered urban residents and
therefore do not qualify for certain social welfare benefits, typically depend on the regular production from their agricultural
collective land as their retirement fund. The central government
worries that these facts, combined with the growing income disparity between the booming eastern cities and the lagging agricultural areas, will increase the level of peasant unrest.97
One expert suggested that more and more developers today
are being forced to negotiate directly with the collectives rather
than acquiring land from the government after the government
has obtained the land from the collectives. The government,
while still nominally required to serve as intermediary, plays a
more passive role than it formerly did. Another knowledgeable
person advised me that Shanghai is undertaking a pilot study that
would allow agricultural collectives to trade land use rights in
certain urban zones, a transaction structure that apparently
with whom I spoke. One of these experts noted to me that while greater freedom of
movement is likely to reduce disparities of wealth among different regions of China,
it also is likely to create enormous social upheaval along the way, and for many
decades to come.
96. Subsequent events in China have confirmed this view. See Joseph Kahn, A
Sharp Debate Erupts In China Over Ideologies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, at A1
(describing the 2006 shelving of the proposed property law by the National People’s
Congress because some scholars and advisers fear “China’s rising income gap and
increasing social unrest” and noting that some Chinese economists view peasants as
“economically disenfranchised”).
97. One lawyer stated that some of these peasants actually receive income for
life in exchange for the loss of their land; another expert explained that these farmers are given jobs as a form of supplementary non-cash compensation. Still another
expert advised me that if an entire agricultural collective is converted to state-owned
land, the displaced farmers become urban residents, which makes them eligible for
retirement benefits, health care, and unemployment insurance.
The Chinese government recently announced that it will experiment in certain
provinces by abolishing the legal distinction between urban residents and peasants.
See Joseph Kahn, China to Drop Urbanite-Peasant Legal Differences, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 2005, at A8 (stressing government’s efforts to “slow the country’s surging
wealth gap and reduce social unrest”).
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places the collective in a position to retain more of the gains from
transferring rights to developable land.
In these evolving settings, developers will have to reach their
own accords with collectives, which presumably are learning to
hold out for prices that reflect the new highest and best use for
their land. Developers pass these costs along to the ultimate purchaser, but now the premium indirectly benefits the rural residents who have been displaced. This process is similar to the
one the government now seeks to enforce when resettling poor
residents of urban areas.
In an effort to cool down the real estate market while reducing the number of peasants who end up without land to cultivate,
the central government recently has enforced land preservation
plans that place strict limits on the amount of arable land that
can be converted to more intensive uses.98 Developers must either replace the land themselves or contribute to a fund that is
used to replace the land or reclaim previously unusable land.99
The central government, which is more concerned with maintaining overall social stability, once again finds itself directly at odds
with provincial and municipal governments, which rely on habitual sales of land use rights to fund their operations.
F. THE CONTINUING NEED

FOR

DEVELOPABLE LAND

The obvious conclusion that any observer reaches is that a
sensible developer would rather build on land that is already
thinly populated than obtain rights to land which it will have to
persuade numerous residents to leave. This conclusion helps to
explain the popularity and success of locales such as Shanghai’s
Pudong New Area, where the few prior residents could be relocated inexpensively.100 Demolition and resettlement costs are far
98. See Land Admin. Law, arts. 31–42 (2004) (requiring conservation of agricultural land, preservation of topsoil, re-use of “wasteland,” and other similar preservation measures).
99. One expert referred to this reclamation process as “turning mud into agricultural land.” It turns out that he really meant it: One method of providing replacement land is to shore up muddy areas in the ever-growing Yangtze River Delta, not
far from Shanghai. He expressed concern that the new Three Gorges Dam, which
has begun to reduce the amount of silt that flows downstream and collects in the
delta, may diminish the amount of mud available for reclamation. Other experts
question the effectiveness of land reclamation, noting that reclaimed land often is
less fertile than the corresponding land lost to agriculture and that reclamation of
marginally fertile land may have negative environmental effects. George C.S. Lin &
Samuel P.S. Ho, China’s Land Resources and Land Use Change, in LAND & HOUSING, supra note 34, at 118.
100. Pudong’s development also was hastened by tax incentives, excellent new
infrastructure, and some rather heavy-handed government pressure. See supra note
62 & accompanying text. It was not just developers who wanted this massive project
to succeed but also the Chinese government at all levels.
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lower, which translates into greater profits and greater ease for
the developer and lower costs for the end user.
Several of the experts I spoke with argued that China’s vast
stock of government- and collective-owned land ensures that the
Chinese economy will not collapse any time soon, as some Western experts have nervously predicted.101 The government can
simply keep transferring land use rights on the ever-expanding
urban fringe102—land that it either owns already or can easily
acquire from agricultural collectives—at hefty prices that reflect
the land’s increasing value for urban residential or commercial
use. These experts argue that as long as the government has land
use rights that it can sell, it will never run out of cash.103

101. Cf. STUDWELL, CHINA DREAM, supra note 49, at 260 (“Confronted with an
insolvent banking system, a rising budget deficit and unfunded welfare liabilities, the
reaction of ministers is to claim that the state owns all kinds of valuable assets [including land] that it can sell to cover its expenditures.”). Studwell continues by disagreeing with this argument, but most of the Chinese professionals I met do not
share his skepticism.
102. “Given that cities generate more than 70 percent of the country’s economic
output, China’s economic success inevitably fuels demand for land at the urban
fringes, where economic development activity is most intense.” Xiaochen Meng &
Yanru Li, Urban Land Supply in the Chinese Transitional Economy: Case Studies in
Beijing and Shenzhen, in LAND & HOUSING, supra note 34, at 125.
China’s cities are growing physically larger at a shocking rate. The average
amount of space per resident is on the rise, cities are increasing the amount of public
space such as parks, and tens of millions of rural residents are migrating to the cities—often without work permits—in search of jobs. An exhibit I viewed at the
Shanghai Planning Museum states that in the past twenty years, Shanghai has razed
4.281 million square meters of blighted housing and replaced it with 16.2 million
square meters of new housing. The same exhibit states that Shanghai’s average per
capita green space grew from 2.41 square meters to 9.15 square meters between 1997
and 2003. During this time period, the official population has been relatively stable
and the unofficial population has been growing steadily. This museum also touts the
advantages of some specific new suburban developments that are being built along
the city’s urban boundary. With more people and more space per person than ever,
Shanghai is expanding both upward and outward, devouring land along the way.
103. One of the Chinese experts I met contrasted China’s slow and smooth approach with that employed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union by Russia,
which disposed of state-owned assets at a much more rapid rate. By selling off stateowned assets—including land—at a more measured speed, China not only preserved
its assets for future use or sale but also retained greater control over the ultimate use
of these assets for a longer period of time. See also Bo-Sin Tang & Sing-Cheong Liu,
Property Developers and Speculative Development in China, in LAND & HOUSING,
supra note 34, at 201 (“In contrast with many Eastern European countries, China
did not pursue full-prong privatization or ‘shock therapy’ in its reform process. Instead, it pursued incremental changes, thereby decreasing the likelihood of major
social instability.”). Cf. PEERENBOOM, LONG MARCH, supra note 2, at 460 (arguing
that Russia’s poor experience with privatization reflects the fact that it sought to
privatize in the absence of rule of law and at a time when its institutions were weak).
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VI. THE LAND USE RIGHT
A. THE LEGAL BASIS

FOR THE

LAND USE RIGHT

In 1988, China amended Article 10 of its Constitution to
read, “The right to the use of land may be transferred in accordance with the law.”104 While this provision does not permit the
private ownership of land,105 it does allow the government to
grant land use rights for a specific term.106 By clarifying that private citizens could not actually own the land itself, the Constitution “avoided abandoning the Marxist principle of state
ownership”107 while simultaneously creating an opportunity for a
104. PRC Constitution, art. 10 (2004).
105. The sentence immediately prior to the one just quoted, which dates back to
the original 1982 adoption of this Constitution, was retained with only conforming
changes and now reads: “No organization or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or
unlawfully transfer land in other ways.” Id. (2004). See also Ming fa tong ze [General Principles of the Civil Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 73 (1987) (P.R.C.) (stating that
“[s]tate property shall be owned by the whole people” and that “[s]tate property is
sacred and inviolable”). The first two sentences of Article 10 of the Constitution
indicate that urban land is owned by the state and that rural and suburban land is
owned either by the state or by collectives. Taken together, these provisions make it
clear that all land is state- or collective-owned, but that the state now is constitutionally empowered to transfer the right to use land. The legal status of land use rights
was further buttressed by a constitutional amendment in 2004. The new language
states that the government must provide compensation when it expropriates land.
PRC Constitution, art. 10 (2004) (“The state may in the public interest expropriate
or take over land for its use in accordance with the law and provide
compensation.”).
106. The Land Administration Law reflects these constitutional changes and provides more specificity. See, e.g., Land Admin. Law, art. 2 (2004) (“No units or individuals may encroach on land or illegally transfer it through buying, selling or other
means. However, the right to the use of land may be transferred in accordance with
law.”).
Prior to the 1988 constitutional change, some jurisdictions had experimented by
leasing the right to use land to private entities. To the extent these precursors to the
land use right were legally binding at all, they were enforceable only as contract
rights; not until the 1988 constitutional amendment could users of property obtain
more stable real estate rights. Professor Chen cites this as an example of a phenomenon that is fairly common in modern China: the rapid implementation of desirable
new policies that lack any basis in the law existing at the time, followed by the law
playing “catch-up.” CHEN, INTRODUCTION, supra note 24, at 117–18.
In a legal system evolving as rapidly as China’s, it is nearly impossible for policies and laws to develop with precise synchronicity. Moreover, local government
officials likely were taking advantage of the pre-1988 legal uncertainty to benefit
themselves. See XIN, CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 29, at 398 (discussing the
corruption that the 1988 amendments may have been designed, at least in part, to
mitigate).
107. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE, supra note 8, at 184. Subsequent changes to the
Chinese Constitution reflect this tense dichotomy between private ownership and
Marxist principles. For example, Article 6 was amended in 1999 by the addition of
the following sentence: “In the primary stage of socialism, the State adheres to a
basic economic system in which the public ownership is dominant and diverse forms
of ownership develop side by side, and upholds a distribution system in which distri-
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private real estate market to flourish.108 The government may
transfer land use rights to residential property for a term of up to
seventy years. For commercial property, the maximum term is
forty years. Industrial and other types of land use rights may not
be granted for terms in excess of fifty years.109
The initial holder of a granted land use right ostensibly is
required to develop the land within two years.110 Many people,
however, indicated to me that this rule is frequently ignored; in
one expert’s straightforward opinion, “Every policy in China,
you can change!” Rights holders may pay an additional fee to
extend the term beyond two years, may initiate minimal construction before the two-year period expires as a means of formally meeting the use-it-or-lose-it requirement, or may seek
extensions of this two-year term, which generally have been
readily available. One person, however, noted that the Shanghai
government has hinted that it may begin to enforce the two-year
rule more strictly, as a means of slowing the overheated real estate market and reducing the ability of investors to speculate on
land use rights in undeveloped land.111
The Chinese granted land use right should not be confused
with the ground lease familiar to Western real estate lawyers.
The two devices demonstrate considerable differences.112 Landbution according to work remains a dominant form and a variety of other modes of
distribution co-exist.” PRC Constitution, art. 6 (2004). See also Chengri Ding &
Gerrit Knaap, Urban Land Policy Reform in China’s Transitional Economy, in
LAND & HOUSING, supra note 34, at 14 (“As a milestone in the evolution of the
Chinese Constitution, the 1988 amendment is significant, because it allowed the
state to maintain ownership and at the same time promoted land market development without provoking political turmoil.”).
108. For a discussion of the extent to which this increased security of land tenure
may lead to sustainable economic growth, see Joyce Palomar, Contributions Legal
Scholars Can Make to Development Economics: Examples from China, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1011 (2004). Cf. Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the
Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89 (2003) (discussing
relative importance of security of property and enforcement of contract rights).
109. While the constitutional amendment authorized the granting of land use
rights, the State Council established the durational limits by regulation. RANDOLPH
& LOU, CREL, supra note 10, at 127–28.
110. Law on Admin. of Urban Real Estate, art. 25 (1995) (imposing a penalty of
up to twenty percent of the fee paid for the land use right if the land is not developed within one year and providing for forfeiture of the land use right if the land is
not developed within two years).
111. In the short run, stricter enforcement of this rule might lead to more development, as rights holders whose two-year terms are nearing expiration begin construction they might otherwise have deferred. But in the long run, those considering
purchases of land use rights for future construction might be inclined to wait if they
fear that their rights will expire before they are ready to use them. If demand for
land use rights began to dry up, prices presumably would drop.
112. See RANDOLPH & LOU, CREL, supra note 10, at 18–19 (expressing belief
that Chinese land use right is derived from German civil law concepts and not from
common law ground lease).
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lord-tenant law generally does not apply to land use rights.113
The price for the land use right is paid entirely in advance, which
is rarely the case with a ground lease, and the grantee may not
register the land use right until it has paid the entire fee.114 The
land to which use rights are granted must be developed within a
fixed amount of time or the right is forfeited, as just noted.
The initial and subsequent non-government holders of land
use rights may further transfer them within certain limits.115 For
example, in the case of residential land, the initial holder of the
right is theoretically precluded from “flipping” the right to a second holder until the initial right holder has completed at least
25% of the proposed construction.116 One scholar who mentioned this requirement to me also noted, however, that this rule
is widely disregarded, with enforcement often obscured by confusion as to exactly how much construction has been completed.
The holder of the land use right also must own the building constructed on that land.117 In addition, some speakers told me that
in parts of China, the purchaser is prohibited from using borrowed funds for the acquisition of a land use right, but they were
unable to clarify whether this is a legal restriction, a limitation
imposed by lenders, or simply common practice.
B. GOVERNMENT SALE

OF

LAND USE RIGHTS

The process for the government’s sale of a land use right,
like so many other procedures in Chinese law, derives from a
113. Id. at 125–26 (emphasizing that most of Chinese landlord-tenant law does
not apply to holders of granted land use rights).
114. One Chinese lawyer indicated that this practice has recently been modified,
and that some owners have been permitted to pay the fee on a periodic schedule
that is similar to regular rent payments. This newer method allows the government
to pace its receipt of the income from the sale of the land use right.
115. RANDOLPH & LOU, CREL, supra note 10, at 131–32.
116. Law on Admin. of Urban Real Estate, art. 38 (1995) (prohibiting a grantee
from further transferring the land use right before “having fulfilled twenty-five percent or more of the total investment for development in the case of housing
projects”).
117. ZIMMERMAN, DESKBOOK, supra note 39, at 739. In that sense, the Chinese
land use right is both similar to and different from the Western ground lease. Because Chinese land can be owned only by the government, the granting of a land use
right by definition severs ownership of the land from ownership of the building constructed on that land, just as the Western ground lease does. But in China, the
holder of the land use right also must own the building constructed on that land,
which forces the developer to incur the capital expense of acquiring the land use
right in its entirety at the beginning of the construction process. Law on Admin. of
Urban Real Estate, art. 31 (1995). The ground lease, by contrast, permits the developer to avoid all or most up-front land acquisition costs. The Chinese land use right,
in short, is not a financing device.
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combination of written law and actual practice.118 Shanghai’s
procedure serves as a useful illustration of these granting practices.119 The government initiates the sale process by deciding on
requirements and specifications for a tract. It asks the Department of Land Administration to evaluate the property’s value,
and this administration establishes a minimum price for the land
use right. The government then publicizes these requirements
and specifications and makes the relevant documents available to
prospective bidders. Bidders then submit sealed bids.120 Each
bid from a developer is solely a price bid, as the government already has established all of the specifications in advance.
Shanghai’s government is not required to select the highest
bidder, a fact that leads unsuccessful bidders to wonder whether
they have been outflanked by corrupt competitors and opens the
government up to more generalized charges of cronyism and
graft. The government’s position, publicized regularly and somewhat defensively, is that it wishes to consider the reputation, experience, skill, and financial strength of each bidder, and not just
the amount it has bid, as a means of ensuring that the winning
bidder is capable of completing the project successfully. While it
might appear to the public that the government would benefit
the most by selecting the highest bidder and receiving the greatest amount of money for the land use right, the government
maintains that a project that is less financially remunerative in
the short run but more likely to be completed successfully may
end up being more beneficial to the community in the long run.
Despite the municipal government’s protestations, prospective bidders who have good personal relationships with highly
placed government officials are widely perceived as enjoying an
118. See Law on Admin. of Urban Real Estate, arts. 11–12 (1995) (describing
procedures for granting of land use rights). See also CHEN, INTRODUCTION, supra
note 24, at 252–53 (discussing the recent historical development of these
procedures).
119. A more complex series of steps than the one described here must be followed if the land to be auctioned is agricultural collective land. See supra notes
91–92 & accompanying text.
120. Shanghai permits open auctions as well, but these are rarely employed.
More generally, land use rights in China may be sold by negotiated agreement, by
invitation of tenders by the government, or by auction. ZIMMERMAN, DESKBOOK,
supra note 39, at 734–35.
For a discussion of regulations promulgated in 2002 that affect the acquisition of
land use rights, see T. Oliver Yee, A Bid For A New Future: What Are the Effects and
Challenges of the New National Public Bidding Regulations on Land Use Rights Assignment in China?, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 447, 449–51, 455–57 (2005)
(noting that new national regulations, modeled on those already in effect in Shanghai, will no longer permit negotiated agreements for transfers of land use rights for
business operations, but also observing that there have been difficulties in implementing these regulations).
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edge; whether they truly do or not is almost immaterial to these
popular views. These perceptions are further enhanced by a belief that the specifications themselves sometimes seem to have
been drafted with particular prospective bidders in mind.121 In
many of the discussions I had with Chinese real estate professionals, concerns that bureaucrats with unfettered discretion
favor developers with guanxi permeated the conversation. As
one lawyer put it, even in Shanghai, it never hurts to know
someone.
Whatever its remaining flaws, Shanghai’s method of auctioning land use rights has improved dramatically and is generally
perceived as having improved. While government officials still
enjoy substantial discretion, Shanghai’s current approach is a significant advance over the mechanism employed before 2002,
under which the municipality would select several reputable developers and negotiate with them privately before choosing one.
Some of the less commercialized provinces apparently still negotiate sales of land use rights in this less transparent manner. Imperfect though they may be, Shanghai’s present procedures are
widely recognized as among the most impartial in China.122
The calculation of “minimum price” that the Department of
Land Administration undertakes can be a complex one. As a
starting point, the floor price should reflect some base value for
the land use right itself. But if the government plans to undertake the additional costly tasks of relocating current residents
and demolishing existing structures, it will pass the costs of these
activities along to the bidders in the form of a higher minimum
price.123 In some cases, the government also factors in a third
component, reflecting certain infrastructure costs that the redevelopment of the land will necessitate. For example, the bidder
may have to foot the bill for facilities specific to the lot, such as
utility connections, or for more general social demands, such as a
new hospital that might now be needed as a result of increased
construction in the area that includes the new development. This
last component of the minimum price for the land use right is
roughly analogous to the impact fees that some American jurisdictions impose. Some of these additional components of the
minimum price, in particular the cost of demolition and resettle121. Similar concerns are raised by the foreclosure process, which is often seen as
providing advantages to favored bidders.
122. See DALI L. YANG, REMAKING THE CHINESE LEVIATHAN: MARKET TRANSITION AND THE POLITICS OF GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 208–213 (2004) (discussing
trend toward use of auctions in granting of land use rights). See also id. at 211
(describing Shanghai and other municipal governments as “hooked on land revenue”). But see supra note 53 (noting recent scrutiny of corruption in Shanghai).
123. See supra notes 85–86 & accompanying text; supra Section V.D.
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ment, further illustrate why developers tend to prefer land that is
already vacant.124
C.

EXPIRATION

OF

LAND USE RIGHTS

One obvious question about China’s current system of land
use rights is what happens to the land use right and the structures
on the land when the term of the right expires. Since the system
of land use rights is less than two decades old while most land use
rights are granted for periods of forty or more years, China’s legal system and real estate market have had little occasion to address this question. One Chinese lawyer told me that he was
aware of a handful of instances in which shorter-term land use
rights, granted originally for less than the legal maximum term,
had been approaching their expiration dates. While the lawyer
stated that the government legally could have recovered possession of the land and the buildings now on the land, he personally
knew of cases in which the government either had been willing to
negotiate an extension of the land use right or had provided compensation for the buildings.125
Given the absence in China of ad valorem property taxes
and given the fact that government at all levels will someday run
out of desirable land on which to grant new land use rights, it
would not be surprising if Chinese government entities were willing to negotiate extensions of land use rights in exchange for the
payment of a periodic or one-time fee to the government. The
amount of this fee could fall anywhere within a fairly wide range.
At the high end, the government could demand that the occupant make an annual payment equal to the fair market rental
value of the land at the time of the renegotiation, perhaps with
periodic increases built in. If this were to happen, the government essentially would become the landlord of every property
occupant in China and would use the proceeds it receives in its
124. Even if the minimum price for the land use right does not include a component reflecting the economic impact of the development on the community, the developer may end up incurring at least some of these costs anyway in a more direct
fashion. For example, the developer may have to install certain utilities itself.
125. Cf. Law on Admin. of Urban Real Estate, art. 21 (1995) (providing that (i)
holder of land use right that wishes to extend it must apply for such an extension no
later than one year before the right expires; (ii) such applications “shall be approved”; and (iii) land user shall execute a new contract “and pay fees for the granting in accordance with the regulations”). This article of the statute does not clarify
what the terms or price of the extension shall be. Professors Randolph and Lou
argue that the government must renew, essentially giving the holder of the land use
right a right of first refusal, but Article 21 does not specifically state this. RANDOLPH & LOU, CREL, supra note 10, at 128–29. One expert suggested to me that a
more accurate translation of Article 21 is that these applications “should be approved,” not “shall be approved,” which implies a greater level of discretion.
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capacity as landlord-to-all to provide government services.126
Land use rights renewed under such a system would resemble
Western ground leases to a greater extent than do current Chinese land use rights, but with the government as ground lessor.
At the low extreme, the government might seek only a small
percentage of the value of the land each year, in which case
China would have ended up adopting a real property taxation
system not unlike that followed in much of the United States.
Under this system, current land occupants may retain occupancy
indefinitely on the condition that they make regular tax payments to the government in an amount that is far lower than the
rental value of the property. The government would have obvious economic incentives for choosing the former method. With
either approach, or any approach in between, rather than receiving periodic rent or tax payments, the government might instead
prefer to receive all of the proceeds from the rights holder at the
outset of the renewal period, essentially treating the renewal of
the land use right in the same way it currently treats the initial
grant of the right.
D. LAND USE RIGHTS, LAND USE CONTROLS, AND
FINANCIAL PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT
The Chinese land use right system also ends up functioning
as a zoning arrangement. When it announces the availability of
land, the government places limits on the uses it will permit, limits that it enforces further in the written document that it executes with the eventual purchaser of the land use right.127 The
establishment and transfer of land use rights is not the only
method of land use control in China—and land that is not subject
to land use rights is not restricted by these types of controls—but
it is one component of an overall land use system. Moreover, the
division of land into government-owned land and land owned by
agricultural collectives also serves as a rudimentary form of
zoning.128
126. See, e.g., Keith McKinnell & Anthony Walker, China’s Land Reform and the
Establishment of a Property Market, in LAND, PROPERTY AND CONSTRUCTION, supra
note 5, at 33 (comparing mainland China’s approach, unfavorably, to that of Hong
Kong).
127. See, e.g., RANDOLPH & LOU, CREL, supra note 10, at 391–92 (setting forth
the provisions regulating land use contained in one of the official forms of contract
for granting land use rights on state-owned land).
128. See supra notes 91–92 & accompanying text. One expert noted to me that
some land owned by agricultural collectives currently is being used for commercial
purposes. This land tends to be in areas in which urban growth has raised the value
of what once was, but no longer is, outlying farmland. Rather than seeing their land
converted from allocated to granted land with the profit going to the local government or the real estate developer, some collectives received permission to build
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Note, however, that the price of a land use right is a function
of the total buildable area that can be constructed on the land. If
that number changes as the building evolves, the price is adjusted
accordingly. This fact provides a stark illustration of the tension
between regulating land uses and maximizing revenues that local
government entities face: A bigger building may be undesirable
for land use planning reasons, but it will generate more revenue.
The possibility of profiting from the sale of land use rights
creates enormous tensions for local governments, and not only
on the lot-by-lot basis just mentioned. Municipal planning bodies may have devised long-term land use programs that restrict
certain types of developments in specified areas. At the same
time, these municipal governments must glimpse enormous revenue-raising possibilities from the sale of prime, restricted land to
a developer who wishes to use it in a way that might not comport
with the overall land use plan.129 Internal and external pressures
are growing to place greater emphasis on environmental considerations, and Shanghai officials frequently stress the increasing
amount of green space that is available to residents of that city.
But if land that is slated for a downtown park proves to be considerably more valuable to its owner—the municipality—than
anticipated, the incentive to sell the land use right to a developer
will grow correspondingly.
The government can, if it chooses, be fairly heavy-handed in
the way in which it uses the land use right system to control patterns of land use. If the government wishes for one area to become, say, a center of international banking, it can decide that it
will grant land use rights to international banks only in that area.
This approach may be a step less intrusive than forcing those
banks to relocate, but it guarantees that when a bank chooses to
move, it will have to move into the designated area.130 As noted
earlier, when the government wanted to encourage foreigners to
relocate to the Jinqiao section of Pudong, it increased the likelihood of this happening by letting the proprietors of several international schools know that their desire to acquire land use rights
would most likely be met should they select locations in
Jinqiao.131
commercial structures on their allocated land and now are in a position to pay dividends to the members of the collective. See also RANDOLPH & LOU, CREL, supra
note 10, at 61 n.8.
129. Compare this problem to the conflict of interest between the central government, which may wish to slow development to a manageable level to keep any real
estate bubbles from bursting, and provincial and municipal governments, which
profit more directly from each sale of a land use right. See generally supra notes
63–72 & accompanying text; infra notes 132–33 & accompanying text.
130. See supra note 62 & accompanying text.
131. Id.
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Nearly every expert with whom I met concurred that provincial and municipal governments employ the sale of land use
rights as an essential means of keeping themselves afloat financially.132 The Chinese real estate bubble has made these rights
quite valuable in some parts of the country, and government
bodies in these regions appear to treat land use rights as cash
cows to be milked as the need arises. Of course, these government entities must recognize that if they sell this land off too
rapidly, they will distort both their own long-term financial viability and the overall real estate market.133 Short-term needs,
however, often tend to trump longer term ideals. There is a great
deal of tension between the ongoing proclivity of municipalities
and provinces to raise needed funds by selling off land use rights
and the primary objective of the central government, which is to
maintain overall social stability on a nationwide basis. Beijing, in
short, perceives far greater reasons to slow the real estate market
down and suffers the least when it succeeds in doing so.
VII. CONCLUSION
China’s recent modernization of its cities would be remarkable if all it had done was spend tremendous sums of money to
replace crumbling buildings and infrastructure. The fact that
China has accomplished these feats despite its prohibition on the
private ownership of land, its stated adherence to Marxist principles, and its absence of a national property law makes these successes even more incredible. By allowing state-owned land to be
controlled by private parties for extended time periods, China
has ignited its private sector, which has been willing to gamble
that the nation’s legal development will eventually catch up to its
economic growth. So far, the private sector has not been disappointed, but the job of law reform is nowhere near complete.
Other features of the Chinese real estate market also demand further maturation. The mortgage industry still is in its infancy. Construction disputes plague many real estate
development projects. Government manipulation of interest
rates and transfer tax rates suggests that the Chinese market is
not as free and open as the Chinese leadership would like outsiders to believe. I plan to examine these and other issues in subsequent articles.
China’s rulers seem to want to rebuild an entire country in
just a few decades. Considering that they began this task recently and that the starting point was an economy that had been
132. See supra notes 63–72 & accompanying text, note 129 & accompanying text.
133. Cf. supra note 103 (comparing China’s approach with that employed by
Russia following the disintegration of the Soviet Union).
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stagnant for half a century, China has made noteworthy progress.
For the interested observer of contemporary real estate markets,
China is the most fascinating place in the world, and the coming
years promise to be no less exciting.

